Chapter 5. National Security



Neoclassical French architecture, Brussels (ca. 1800).

THE FAILURE OF PAST POLICIES of neutrality has convinced the Belgian people that a coordinated collective response was necessary not only to protect Belgian territory but also to deter future aggression in Western Europe. The armed forces of Belgium have therefore been fully integrated into the collective security framework of post-World War II Western Europe. A founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Belgium has consistently supported the alliance with manpower and financial contributions despite economic hardship and political turmoil.

Although the king is technically commander in chief of the armed forces, they are under the operational authority of the Ministry of National Defense and a joint ministerial committee composed of the ministers of national defense; foreign affairs; the interior and public office; justice and institutional reform; and communications posts, telephones, and telegraphs. This committee collectively oversees the three conventional military services—the army, navy, and air force—as well as the gendarmerie, which is the internal security or state police force. The Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff provide centralized logistic support, major policy direction and planning, and the allocation of tasks among the services, which nevertheless train separately and retain distinct individuality.

Approximately two-thirds of the armed forces are volunteer or career military personnel; the gendarmerie is all volunteer. The army, having a larger component of its staff deployed in the field, draws about 50 percent of its personnel from the draft; the navy and air force have smaller percentages of conscripts. Eighteen- and 19-year-old men are subject to conscription. After considerable debate throughout Belgian history, both parliament and the armed forces make every effort to keep the selective service system equitable for all economic, linguistic, and social groups.

Despite economic hardship Belgium has maintained a steady rate of spending for defense at a level of approximately 2.5 percent of the gross domestic product and has managed a 3-percent annual increase in spending allocated to NATO. The Belgian industrial sector also has had an effect on defense, especially in the manufacture and assembly of small arms for export and in the coproduction of F-16 fighter aircraft for Europe and the United States.

Belgium has been an integral member of NATO since the inception of the alliance in 1949. Despite some opposition Belgium has generally supported the NATO modernization programs for air defense and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Ground-launched cruise missiles have been assigned to a base in Florennes in the province of Namur and were expected to be operational by early 1985; however, the final decision on Belgian acceptance of the missiles was subject to domestic political considerations. In late 1984, however, improvements in the air defense system were subject to intense debate; decisions to upgrade the existing defense system were based on economic, not military, considerations.

Internal security has been maintained by the gendarmerie, the Criminal Police, the municipal police forces, and the rural constabulary. Criminal justice was administered by a three-tiered judicial system. The great majority of the convicted received conditional sentences of weekend imprisonment or community service in lieu of more severe penalties. Belgium is generally regarded as free from human rights abuses.

Historical Background

The armed services in Belgium have traditionally been regarded as a force to be drawn from the people, who have regarded national defense as a personal as well as a national responsibility. The armed forces were considered a shield of protection, not only from foreign invasion but also from tyranny at home. Several factors have nonetheless interfered with public support for the armed forces. Powerful neighbors exerted pressure on Belgium throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, forcing it to maintain a policy of positive neutrality. By curtailing external involvement of the Belgian armed forces, the policy of neutrality left the military with no visible mission and no base for public support. Morale within the military was difficult to maintain. Conscription practices also led to dissatisfaction; those unable to purchase exemptions and those willing to sell their services to the wealthy made up the bulk of the Belgian military in the nineteenth century.

In spite of these factors, however, some military tradition and esprit de corps did develop. A few families made successful military careers, and many more developed close camaraderie during their service in the Civil Guard. The guard was established at the time of independence, in 1830, and continued as the

Belgian soldiers surrender to German soldiers near Brugge on May 28, 1940, in a war that convinced most Belgians of the need for a strong European alliance structure. Courtesy Belgium Information and Documentation Institute

internal security militia until 1921, when it was replaced by the modern gendarmerie. In 1984 some elderly Belgians still recalled the plumed helmets and ornate uniforms that were worn by the guards during parades and other ceremonies. The working class, however, had little sympathy for the Civil Guard because it was frequently required to suppress workers' demonstrations for higher pay and improved working conditions. They also did not care for the regular army, in which the workers served as conscripts.

The selective service evolved from an inadequate system of favoritism in the nineteenth century to an inherently egalitarian system in the 1980s. Selective service was originally conceived as a means of creating a broad-based armed force responsible to the elected government, rather than a select group of professional warriors hired by, and responsible exclusively to, the head of state. The Belgians wished to avoid the French and Prussian experience in which strong leaders used the national army to satisfy

personal ambitions.

Until 1910 selection of individuals for conscription was determined by lottery. The law also provided loopholes for those not wishing to serve. A lottery number was regarded as "good" if it resulted in an exemption, "bad" if it led to selection. Poor individuals with bad numbers served long tours of duty with little or no compensation. Wealthy individuals with bad numbers were often able to arrange for a paid substitute to serve in their place. Insurance companies wrote policies covering bad luck at the lottery. The inequities of the selective service system also caused political and social unrest (see World War I, ch. 1).

The system was widely recognized as unsatisfactory, and 17 laws were written attempting to correct it between 1830 and 1910. Finally, in 1913, universal compulsory service was adopted and the lottery abandoned. The law has been modified over time, but changes adopted in the 1960s made the draft as equitable and generally acceptable as it has ever been in Belgium.

Belgium has often been a pawn in the game of European power politics. In 1815 the combined armies of Britain, Prussia, and Imperial Russia defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo, making possible the creation of an independent Belgium in 1830. The guaranteed neutrality of the new state was to be ensured by the great powers, who allowed Belgium to exist as a territorial buffer state between them. The guarantee, however, was not enforced.

The German "Schlieffen Plan" deliberately violated Belgian neutrality in August 1914, the beginning of World War I. The plan was designed to preclude a two-front war in the east and the west by striking at the heart of France along the Franco-German frontier. German troops were to sweep through Luxembourg and Belgium into northern France, envelop Paris, and force the retreating French army into the Moselle River valley, where it would be defeated. The key to the plan was rapid progress through Belgium. The Belgian armed forces provided limited opposition to the advancing German troops but nevertheless were able to threaten the lengthening German supply lines. This threat influenced the German decision to avoid directly attacking Paris and to slow the advance across Belgium. The Belgian Army refused to surrender and established defensive trenches in western Flanders in September 1914. The four-day battle of the Marne turned the tide of the war from imminent German victory to a four-year stalemate on the western front. The Belgian military effort was an example of how seemingly hopeless defensive operations can be crucial for victory in a larger strategic context.

After World War I Belgium entered into the collective security framework of the League of Nations. It also abandoned the earlier policy of neutrality and negotiated a mutual defense ageement with Britain and France. Germany became stronger, however, and Belgium again proclaimed a policy of neutrality on October 28, 1936, and renounced the defensive agreements. German troops invaded Belgium on May 10, 1940, and quickly defeated the Belgian opposition. The Belgian forces surrendered after 18 days, but some of the armed forces escaped to Britain and continued to fight with British and Allied forces.

At the end of World War II, Belgium again became an adherent of collective security. It became a founding member of the Western European Union, established by the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, and was one of the 12 founding members of NATO in 1949. The North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body, has its headquarters in Brussels (see Appendix C). Allied Command Europe, NATO's principal European military command, is also located in Belgium, near Mons in the province of Hainaut.

Organization and Mission of the Armed Forces

The failure of Belgian neutrality in the military conflicts of twentieth-century Europe led the post-World War II government to pursue collective security actively and, in 1948, to establish the joint defense system that evolved into NATO. Recognizing that individual national responses were no longer adequate to ensure security against threats of aggression, the government agreed to integrate most of its armed forces into a unified military organization. Logistical support and defense of the homeland, however, remained a national responsibility. Manpower levels have remained relatively constant since the mid-1960s. The armed forces totaled about 93,600 in 1984, of which approximately one-third were conscripts.

To coordinate civilian and military aspects of Belgian defense, a joint ministerial defense committee under the direction of the prime minister is convened when circumstances require a decision from the highest level of government. Members of this committee include the ministers of national defense; foreign affairs; the interior and public office; justice and institutional reform; and communications, posts, telephones, and telegraph.

The armed forces are under the direct authority of the minister of defense. There are two main suborganizations of the Ministry of National Defense: the Central Administration, which is re-

sponsible for administrative, financial, and juridical problems; and the more important General Staff. The chief of the General Staff is responsible to the minister of defense for the operational readiness of the armed forces. Plans to achieve this readiness are established in collaboration with the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces and the head of the Medical Branch (see fig. 14).

The General Staff has been reorganized several times since 1960, but the organization in place in late 1984 had been in effect for 20 years. It gives the chief of the General Staff a joint staff responsible for the coordination of policy, planning, programs, personnel, and logistics, while the army, air force, and naval chiefs of staff are responsible for the management of their services. The same responsibility is entrusted to the head of the Medical Branch, which is an interservice program.

The armed forces are organized according to the missions they are required to fulfill. They are within the area of responsibility of two NATO major commands. Although the army and the air force assign personnel to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Belgian Navy operates under the Commander in Chief, Channel. Part of the army remains under Belgian national authority and is referred to as the Forces of the Interior. The gendarmerie also plays a role in the maintenance of the security of Belgian territory (see Internal Security, this ch.)

The Army

The army consists of two major components: the 1st Belgian Corps, which is assigned to NATO, and the Forces of the Interior, which are responsible for the defense of Belgian territory. The 1st Belgian Corps is deployed operationally, having most of its units in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The deployment of Belgian Army units in West Germany dates back to 1945, when the Belgian brigades of the newly re-formed army took part in military operations with the British army at the end of World War II. They then remained as occupation forces and part of NATO (see fig. 15)

The primary mission of the Belgian forces in West Germany is to defend their assigned sector against attack and, with their allies, to fight in any conflict, conventional or nuclear. The 1st Belgian Corps is composed of two active divisions, each having three mechanized brigades in peacetime and, if necessary, four in war. The corps has a number of supporting units. The brigades include two armored infantry battalions, one antitank battalion, one or two tank battalions, one artillery battalion, an engineer company, and logistical support units.



Source: Based on information from John Keegan, ed., *World Armies*, Detroit, 1983, 50.

Figure 14. Levels of Command for Ministry of National Defense and for Armed Forces

The 1st Belgian Corps has a total strength of 34,000 in peacetime, which can be doubled in case of war. Most of the units have been stationed in West Germany, and many of the associated family dependents have lived outside Belgium for more than 25 years. At one time, more than 60,000 Belgians living in West Germany had to be supported by the military. In 1973 two of the active brigades were reassigned to Belgian territory, one to the northern Leopoldsburg area, the other to the southern Bastogne/Marche-en-Famenne area. This has solved some of the immediate social problems but has also increased the distance from assigned operational areas during training or war.

The units of the lst Belgian Corps have participated in a number of annual exercises and maneuvers, and their operational readiness has been continually maintained. Most of the equipment has been renovated or upgraded since 1975. Although the Leopard tank was standard in the armored battalions, various smaller armored vehicles were used by the reconnaissance units. The antitank battalion was equipped with various light antitank weapons (LAWs) and antitank missiles, such as the Swingfire, Milan, and the Panzerjäger. Honest John tactical missiles were being replaced by Lance missiles in 1984. The German-manufactured Gepard antiaircraft gun system has also been added to the antiaircraft batteries. The Epervier, an unmanned drone of Belgian construction, has been used for battlefield surveillance. The field artillery consisted primarily of United States-built, self-propelled guns. In 1984 Belgium agreed to purchase a number of Canadian-built four-wheel-drive jeeps to replace existing vehicles used by the armored infantry battalions.

The Forces of the Interior have a triple role. In peacetime they have the responsibility of helping the lst Belgian Corps by running training schools and preparing for the mobilization of reserve forces. In the event of war, they are to defend Belgian territory and protect the allied as well as Belgian lines of communication. They also have a logistic responsibility to the air force and the navy and supply medical assistance to the gendarmerie. The average strength of the Forces of the Interior is 35,000, but if the mobilized reserve is included, they would total approximately 195,000.

The Forces of the Interior are made up of army units and in time of war would be supplemented by local gendarmerie and reserve forces. The Regiment of Para-Commandos, an elite, highly trained unit, supplements the Forces of the Interior with three battalions—two airborne infantry units and one commando unit. (The commando troops are the equivalent of the United States

Belgian armored tanks participating in training exercise Leopard 1
Courtesy Embassy of Belgium Washington

Belgian M109A1 howitzer on training exercise
Courtesy Embassy of Belgium, Washington



Source: Based on information from John Keegan, ed., *World Armies*, Detroit, 1983, 51.

Figure 15. Organization of 1st Belgian Corps in Federal Republic of Germany.



Final assembly of the F-100 engine, the basic engine of the F-16 fighter, at the Fabrique Nationale plant in Herstal, Liège Province. Belgium assembles these engines under a special agreement with the United States. Courtesy Belgium Information and Documentation Institute

Rangers.) In addition to its mission in the overall defense of Belgium, this regiment furnishes an artillery and armored reconnaissance battalion to the NATO mobile forces. The para-commandos are the most battle-experienced of the Belgian armed forces, having fought in Kolwezi province in Zaïre (formerly the Belgian Congo) as recently as 1978.

The Air Force

The Belgian Air Force plays a deterrent role as part of the NATO command in Europe. If the land-based deterrent capability of NATO were to fail, the air force would fight for the defense of the NATO area. Its mission would be to participate in the overall NATO air defensive plan and give air support to the land-based forces. The air force has three major divisons: the Tactical Air Command, the Training Command, and the Logistics Command. The Tactical Command is responsible for the operational air wings that are assigned to NATO. The air force has a strength of

approximately 20,000, of which 3,600 are conscripts. The majority of flying and technical personnel are volunteers.

In 1984 two all-weather fighter-bomber wings of the air force were equipped with F-16 aircraft, manufactured in part in Belgium. The mixed reconnaissance and fighter-bomber wing was equipped with French-made Mirage 5 aircraft, as was a second fighter-bomber wing. Each of the these four wings consisted of two squadrons. The transport wing was made up of a squadron of C-130H cargo planes and a composite squadron of passenger-type aircraft, including Boeing 727s, Merlin IIIAs, and Falcon 20s. The helicopter squadron flew Sea King aircraft on air and sea missions and used large transport helicopters when moving equipment and personnel. Air force training has received consistent praise from NATO, as has its performance in NATO training exercises.

The air force also has been responsible for maintaining air defense installations in conjunction with NATO. In 1984 six squadrons of surface-to-air Nike Hercules missiles were assigned to the NATO Second Tactical Air Force as the Belgian contribution to aircraft and air defense units shared by the Netherlands, Britain, and West Germany. Budgetary constraints, however, have led Belgium not to upgrade the air defense system with Patriot missiles. These same constraints also forced a decision to dismantle two of the existing six Nike Hercules batteries in 1984. Belgium remained responsible for the operation of two NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) radar stations that regulate civilian as well as military air traffic.

Civil defense has received little emphasis in Belgian planning. Belgian citizens were reminded that defense plans exist only by the occasional testing of air raid sirens by the police, fire department, and military reserves. Basements of large buildings, as well as the Brussels subway system, were designed for use as shelters in the event of enemy attack.

The Navy

The main mission of the Belgian Navy within the NATO framework is to protect the maritime lanes of communication that pass through the English Channel and the North Sea. The shallowness of Belgian waters and the narrow access to Belgian ports make them vulnerable to mine and submarine attack. The Belgian Navy has three different missions: antisubmarine warfare, antimine operations, and defense of the coast and ports. These are both NATO and national responsibilities in time of war. In peacetime the navy is also responsible for other tasks, such as pro-

tection of fisheries, antipollution operations, sea rescue and, if necessary, the clearing of mines. In late 1984 the Belgian Navy assisted the British and French navies in removing radioactive material from a cargo vessel that had accidentally sunk in the North Sea.

The navy has approximately 4,550 personnel, of which about one-quarter are conscripted. As in the other services, their organization is based on three functions: operations, training, and logistics. Naval ships are stationed in the ports of Oostende, Zeebrugge, and Kalloo. The combined Belgian-Dutch Anti-Mine Warfare School is located in Oostende.

To fulfill its mission, the navy has assigned a number of vessels to NATO. These included seven ocean-minehunter/sweepers, six coastal minesweepers, and 14 shallow-water minesweepers. Two ships, the Godetia and the Zinnia, have served as logistical and command-support ships. Four frigates armed with French-made Exocet ship-to-ship missiles and Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles have been available to protect merchant vessels against submarine threats. In addition to the main fleet, a number of smaller ships have been assigned to specific tasks, such as oceanographic study, river patrols, and ammunition and water transport. Three Alouette III helicopters were used as well.

The Medical Branch

The Medical Branch is a separate organization of the armed forces and is responsible for all aspects of medical support. It is organized for field operation and to expedite casualty evacuation from areas of combat operation. The Medical Branch supports all units of the armed forces that are based in Belgium, including the gendarmerie.

The Medical Branch consists of two major commands, one serving with the 1st Belgian Corps in West Germany, the second on Belgian territory. The latter command would be subdivided during war into two commands, one responsible for medical support for the combat area and the other to assist with medical problems in Belgium. In turn, these commands are subdivided into specific units, such as field hospital evacuation units, mobile surgical units, and ambulance companies. The strength of the Medical Branch is approximately 6,000 but would increase to about 24,000 in war.

Language and the Belgian Armed Forces

Detailed laws regulating the use of language in the Belgian armed forces have been designed to balance the principles of lin-

guistic equality with the requirements for efficient operation of the military chain of command. The basic law of 1938 (amended in 1955, 1961, 1963, and 1970) stresses the right of individuals to use their native tongue while satisfying their national military obligation. The language preference of each soldier is presumed to be that of the region of residence at the time of entry into the military, unless a specific request is made for assignment to another language group. Residents of Brussels declare their preference at the moment of induction. Basic military training is then given to the recruit in the native tongue, after which the soldier joins a monolingual unit. All orders, communications, commands, and general administrative work are conducted exclusively in the language of the unit concerned. Any official communication between the administration of the armed forces and the individual soldier is in the language of the region in which the individual resides.

Commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are required to have at least a working knowledge of both national languages. Language competency is established through testing. A thorough knowledge of one of the national languages and a working knowledge of the other is required for entrance to the Royal Military Academy and War College and for promotion. Fluency in both languages is a prerequisite for promotion to all of the senior ranks above captain. Personnel policies of the armed forces have been formulated to ensure parity between the language groups among the senior officers; 60 percent of the junior officers, NCOs, and civilian personnel are supposed to be Dutch speaking. Forty percent are French speaking.

In 1982 some 59 percent of all Belgian officers were Dutch speaking, and 41 percent were French speaking. This reflected a significant effort by the Belgian military to achieve the linguistic balance, regulated by the 1938 law and its subsequent revisions. It was a distinct change from the French- speaking bias among officers that prevailed until the early 1970s.

Manpower, Support, and Conditions of Service

There were approximately 93,600 personnel serving on active duty in the Belgian armed forces and the gendarmerie in 1984, or about 3.6 percent of the adult population between the ages of 17 and 45. This represented 2.9 percent of the total Belgian work force.

The gendarmerie was an all-volunteer force, but one-half of the army, one-third of the navy, and one-fifth of the air force are



Belgian frigate Wielingen
Courtesy Embassy of Belgium, Washington

selected by the draft. Universal conscription has been in effect since 1964. Although the draft remained a controversial political issue, extensive efforts have been made to ensure that the process was as impartial and as beneficial to individuals of draft age as possible. Women are not required to register for the draft but may volunteer for service in the armed forces. In 1984 about 3,500 women were serving in the Belgian armed forces.

Preliminary screening to determine draft eligibility and classification occurs at age 16. In 1981, for example, more than 223,000 males aged 16 were screened or tested. Of these about 45,000 were deemed physically and mentally able for service. About 39,000 males aged 18 and 19 were called into one of the armed forces during 1981.

Preliminary screening of 16-year-olds permits the local authorities and the armed forces to determine the military occupational specialty as well as the service compatibility of the potential draftees. There are also tests of educational background and proficiency in mechanical and electrical engineering. In 1981 over 70 percent of those entering the armed forces had educations beyond the elementary-school level. The services also admit a small number—about 350 in 1981—of physically handicapped or

mentally impaired individuals who are assigned to positions where their abilities can best be used.

Service Obligations

Each male must register at age 16 and is liable for service in the army, navy, or air force two or three years later. Authorities communicate with potential draftees annually after registration. Registrants normally are called at age 18, or one year later upon request for a deferment. All eligible draftees are automatically called up when they are 19. Prior to that, each individual undergoes two days of questioning, screening, and testing in order to determine background, education, interests, abilities, qualifications, and assignment preferences. At that time the selection board recommends specific service and training assignments. If the candidate is qualified, a more intensive, 15-month reserve officer training course may be offered. Otherwise, the normal service tour is eight to 10 months. Upon completion of this tour of duty, military conscripts remain in the active reserve until age 45. Enlisted men are recalled only once after active duty; officers are annually recalled for one month.

The percentage of those conscripted who ultimately serve in capacities advantageous to themselves is not known, but the armed forces make a positive effort to encourage the draftees to regard their service as a right and an honor as well as a duty to the state. Accordingly, the Belgian armed forces admit only Belgian citizens and reject all applications from non-Belgians. Belgians who have resided out of the country for five consecutive years prior to conscription are considered to have lost ties with their communities to such an extent that exemptions are granted. Belgian law also guarantees that conscripts may return to their old jobs after completion of their service obligation.

Deferments are granted for a variety of reasons. The sole supporter of parents or siblings, the oldest son in a family having five or more children, or anyone with unusual problems is deferred. Merchant marines, coal miners, and those in high-priority jobs are deferred or exempted. Students may be deferred on an annual basis until they have completed secondary or technical school. They may start a university course and be deferred while they complete the course in a specified time period. Exemptions are granted to the physically unfit and to some for whom a military tour of duty would constitute an unusual hardship. Deferments are also granted for conscientious objection to military service, but the individual is required to participate in noncombative work.

Woman in Belgian Army practicing marksmanship using Fabrique Nationale 7.62m rifle
Courtesy Embassy of Belgium, Washington

Voluntary service for three years in poor or less developed countries may be substituted for military duty. The law defines missionaries, physicians, teachers, engineers, agricultural specialists, and skilled blue-collar workers in broad enough terms so that virtually any Belgian having a professional or technical skill of value to developing economies may choose this option. About 80 percent of those who have chosen this option were educators, most of the remainder were physicians.

Training and Logistics

Training for new conscripts and enlistees is on a continuing monthly schedule. As a result, the armed forces remain in a better state of readiness than would be possible if all new soldiers were inducted at one time. All kinds of training facilities operate 52 weeks per year, enabling individuals to get the most from their instructors. All military units are in a constant state of partial preparedness—much different from systems where training progresses by annual cycles to develop fully trained, combat-ready forces at the end of the year.

A variety of in-service schools are available for technical and administrative training of NCOs, as well as schools in Zedelgem and Dinant for warrant officers. Technical schools for naval personnel are located in Oostende and Brugge; the air force technical school is in Saffraanburg, and flight training occurs in Goetsenhoven and Brustem.

The Royal Military Academy and War College, founded in 1834, is located in Brussels. It is the primary source of regular officers for all four services and offers a bachelor of military science and economics degree upon completion of a four-year curriculum and a civil engineering degree that requires five years of study. The war college program for the midcareer training of professional officers consists of a two-year course that prepares officers for positions of greater responsibility.

Pay scales for service personnel are comparable to those of the other European NATO members. When monetary allowances for food, housing, and clothing are included, the lowest grade soldier is compensated at about the same rate as the typical unskilled laborer in Belgian industry. NCOs are paid on a scale roughly equivalent to blue-collar workers. Officers receive lower salaries than their civilian counterparts in managerial positions, but fringe benefits permit them a comparable standard of living.

Medical Care

Military medical facilities are designed to provide for the medical and health requirements of armed forces personnel, to cope with emergencies and disasters, and to maintain accepted standards of medicine and sanitation. Routine medical care is available to active-duty military personnel as well as to the reserves and the retired. Their dependents can also use civilian facilities at little or no cost, depending on the coverage to which they subscribe.

Military hospitals admitted more than 21,000 patients in 1981. Patients with respiratory diseases, gastrointestinal problems, and injuries caused by accidents were treated in greater numbers than any other group. Military hospitals treated relatively few cases of cancer and, as a result of high sanitary standards, had few cases of infectious or parasitic disease.

Emergency treatment is available for military personnel at the nearest medical facility, military or civilian. Civilians may also receive medical treatment at military facilities under similar emergency conditions. Military medical teams are able to respond to major catastrophes quickly, and they have the necessary equipment to establish temporary treatment centers or to

evacuate victims to larger hospitals.

Military Justice

The armed forces adhere to the national criminal code but have an additional list of purely military offenses, such as absence without leave, desertion, sleeping on guard duty, misuse of weapons and equipment, and breaches of military discipline. Military justice agencies and military courts have jurisdiction only over military personnel. They do not ordinarily try civilians, even those who commit crimes on military installations. The military courts may also waive jurisdiction for petty offenses committed off the bases, such as traffic violations. If, however, the infraction is serious enough to warrant confinement, either before trial or as a result of sentencing, the case is almost always remanded to a military court. Action in borderline cases is decided upon jointly by civil and military authorities, but the armed forces have final authority on jurisdictional questions.

Minor infractions are dealt with by administrative punishment at the individual unit level. Company punishment may consist only of penalties such as area restriction or extra and undesirable work. These penalties may only be specified for limited time periods. If an individual feels that unjust punishment has been imposed, trial before a formal military court may be requested.

Military courts are separate from civilian courts at low levels, but the military section of the civilian Court of Cassation rules on military cases at the appeal level (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). The composition of military courts varies with the rank of the accused, and all other members of a court, except professional lawyers and judges, must have superior rank. If the Court of Cassation determines, upon appeal, that a military trial procedure or verdict was improper, it may erase the guilty verdict, change the sentence, or return the case for retrial in a different military court.

Ranks, Uniforms, and Decorations

The army and air force each have a total of 17 ranks: five for enlisted personnel, two for warrant officers, and 10 officer grades. In the officer group there are three general, three field-grade, and four company-grade ranks. This hierarchy represents a departure from typical rank structures in a majority of the world's armed forces by creating a rank of captain commandant between the captain and major ranks and also by limiting general officers to three instead of four or five grades (see fig. 16).

Warrant officers are referred to as adjutants and chief adjutants, indicative of their primarily administrative functions. Below

ARMY	Sous-Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Capitaine / Capitaine-Commandant	Major	Lieutenant-Colonel	Colonel	Général de Brigade	Général-Major	Lieutenant-Général
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General
NAVY	Enseigne de Vaisseau Deuxième Classe	Enseigne de Vaisseau	Lieutenant de Vaisseau / Lieutenant de Vaisseau Première Classe	Capitaine de Corvette	Capitaine de Fregate	Capitaine de Vaisseau	Commodore	Amiral de Division	Vice-Amiral
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Ensign	Lieutenant Junior Grade	Lieutenant	Lieutenant Commander	Commander	Captain	Commodore	Rear Admiral	Vice Admiral
AIR FORCE	Sous-Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Capitaine / Capitaine-Commandant	Major	Lieutenant-Colonel	Colonel	Général de Brigade	Général-Major	Lieutenant-Général
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General

Figure 16. Officer Ranks, Insignia, and United States Equivalents

them are three sergeant grades; sergeants are NCOs. At the lower end of the rank scale are corporals and privates (see fig. 17).

The navy and the gendarmerie have similar and parallel rank structures. Both services have the same number of ranks as the army and air force at levels below that of general officer. The navy has two admiral ranks; the gendarmerie has two general officer ranks. The gendarmerie also has special titles for its enlisted grades but uses army ranks at higher levels. Naval ranks follow established patterns: two degrees of ensign and two degrees of lieutenant. However, instead of the usual commander ranks, three degrees of captain are used. Petty officer and seaman grades are similar to those of other navies.

The army uses rank insignia primarily on the collars and caps of its uniforms. To differentiate between ranks, it is necessary to recognize small insignia details, but it is unreliable to differentiate high or low rank by the degree of ornateness of the patch. Cap insignia, however, do become more striking with increasing rank.

Sleeve and shoulder board stripes on navy and air force uniforms closely resemble those of the majority of other armed forces and are relatively easy to recognize. Gendarmerie rank is shown on caps of all ranks, on sleeves of enlisted personnel, and on shoulder boards of officer uniforms.

The army service uniform most frequently worn for light work and informal recreation includes olive-khaki coats and trousers that are worn by all ranks. The navy uniform is navy blue. The air force uniform is also dark blue but a slightly lighter shade than that of the navy. The gendarmerie uniform is also a dark shade of blue. With the exception of navy whites, the summer uniforms of all services are identical in color but lighter in weight than the winter uniforms.

The Order of Leopold, when awarded with its "collar", is the highest and most cherished Belgian decoration. The order is actually a beautifully jeweled, unusually ornate necklace from which the medal itself is suspended. The order is also awarded in lower degrees that do not include the necklace; different medals of the same degree may also be struck for civilians. The Order of Leopold is followed in importance by the Order of the Crown and the Order of Leopold II. These decorations are awarded in five degrees. They are followed by the Iron Cross, the Military Cross, and the Croix de Guerre. During World War I and World War II, the Croix de Guerre was presented to members of foreign armies more frequently than were the other high Belgian military decorations.

Figure 17. Enlisted Ranks, Insignia, and United States Equivalents

Defense Spending and Defense-Related Industry

The Belgian defense budget has been designed to provide for an efficient defense within the limits of available public funding. This level of spending has been relatively constant in relation to the gross domestic product (GDP) since 1975, at a level of 2 to 2.5 percent of the total. NATO commitments have also required Belgium to acquire matériel comparable to and compatible with that of the alliance partners in terms of modernization and also in terms of sharing similar burdens of support for the alliance. Since 1971 the overall level of Belgian defense spending has increased proportionally in response to NATO requests for greater alliance participation.

The concept of burden sharing or equity in the allied defense effort is a highly complex and volatile process. Central to any assessment of the Belgian defense contribution must be its economic capacity, its sense of vulnerability, its perception of threat, and a number of extraneous factors, such as cultural and historical influences. Defense remains a national prerogative and constant concern in Belgium, and although NATO has developed an allied consensus on policy guidelines and actions, Belgian contributions toward the implementation of these agreed upon measures have reflected this concern despite economic decline (see Belgium and NATO, this ch.; Role of Government, ch. 3).

In 1981 and 1982 defense expenditures amounted to an estimated BF90 billion (for value of the Belgian franc—see Glossary). This amount represented a constant defense expenditure of about 2.2 percent of GDP since 1975. It also reflected an annual 4-percent increase in overall national defense spending within the defense portion of the budget; 50 percent of available funding was allocated toward personnel expenses, 26 percent for operational costs, and the remaining 24 percent toward equipment maintenance and resupply.

Each country in Europe has its own tradition of arms sales, each with its own special pressures and conflicts. The most persistent sellers of all are the Belgians, who have been renowned as weapons manufacturers and traders since the Middle Ages. In the fifteenth century, for example, Charles the Bold of Burgundy forbade the city of Liège—then as today the center of the Belgian armaments industry—from producing weaponry. When this ban was defied, Charles had the city razed and its inhabitants slaughtered. Liège was also the first antinational arms trafficker—that is, its armaments manufacturers sold weapons to known enemies. In 1596, when the duke of Alva invaded the Low Coun-

tries, the Dutch and Flemish defenders were armed with weapons manufactured in Liège. So were the duke's Spanish legions.

In the nineteenth century Liège became more important as the headquarters of Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre (FN), which remains today one of the world's most aggressive manufacturers and exporters of small arms, such as rifles, machine guns, and Browning pistols. More than 90 percent of total Belgian small arms production is exported each year. In 1981, for example, small arms valued at US$270 million were exported. Although this represents only 0.5 percent of total Belgian exports in 1981, given the inexpensive nature of small arms, this amount represents a significant infusion of weaponry into the international market. Although Belgium officially has stringent controls on these sales, FN rifles have found their way to many areas of conflict: they were the first arms to reach Cuba after the Fidel Castro takeover and were used by both sides in the Congo crisis, by the Christians in Lebanon, and by all warring factions in Central America.

FN has also aggressively sought business with major military powers. In 1976 the United States Army awarded a large contract to FN to produce small machine guns for armored vehicles. FN built a small factory in South Carolina to satisfy this agreement. FN has also manufactured jet engines for the European coproduced F-16 fighter aircraft that have been purchased by Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the United States, and other countries.

In 1984 Belgium continued to be regarded as a major supplier of small arms throughout the world. Although the weapons manufactured in Belgium represented less of an immediate threat than the larger weapons exported by other states, they nevertheless continued to have a significant impact on world affairs. Belgian-made arms have been present on international battlefields since 1945, and in late 1984 there was no indication that such arms supplies would cease to have an immediate impact on international relations.

Belgium and NATO

Belgium has been one of the strongest supporters of NATO since the inception of the alliance in 1949. Having suffered through two invasions in two world wars, Belgium was aware of its security needs and the limitations of its means for self-defense. As

a result, the leaders of that nation began calling for the formation of a defensive alliance shortly after the liberation of Belgium at the end of World War II. In March 1948 Belgium joined with France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Britain in an agreement to establish a joint defense system. This agreement, known as the Treaty of Brussels, was a recognition that individual national responses to the threat of aggression were inadequate and that a united defense effort was necessary for mutual security.

In 1948, after expressions of concern by several European states that the Treaty of Brussels was too limited in scope and effectiveness, the prime minister of Canada called for a mutual defense system comprised of Western Europe and North America. On April 4, 1949, the foreign minister of Belgium joined with representatives from Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States in signing the treaty forming NATO Greece and Turkey became members in 1952, West Germany joined the alliance in 1955, and Spain became a member in 1982. The treaty established NATO as a multilateral political alliance that binds its members to obligations of mutual defense and economic cooperation.

Belgium has influenced the alliance policy in many ways. One of the country's most prominent international statesmen, Paul Henri Spaak, served as secretary general of NATO from 1957 to 1961. When France withdrew from the military operations of NATO in 1966, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe was transferred to Mons, in a rural area southwest of Brussels. Six months later, the organization's political headquarters was also relocated to Brussels.

In 1967 the North Atlantic Council formally adopted a proposal, formulated by Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel, that altered the nature of NATO policy. The Harmel plan called for NATO to be partially transformed from an entirely defensive system to one designed to encourage East-West détente and increased political consultation among the members of the alliance.

By the late 1970s, however, the optimistic policy of East-West rapprochement had deteriorated. Arms control negotiations were not achieving results, and the NATO countries became increasingly concerned about the Soviet military buildup. As a result of this concern, the NATO countries pledged to maintain an annual 3-percent growth in their defense spending. Reassessing the Harmel report in May 1978, the NATO ministers had a more somber view of the Soviet Union and a less optimistic projection for East-West cooperation in Europe. Having voiced these con-

cerns, the ministers nevertheless reaffirmed the continued validity of the complementary goals of the maintenance of military superiority and the pursuit of détente.

The decision to adhere to 3-percent annual growth in defense spending has led to disagreement among NATO allies on the proportion of funding that each state can give to the alliance. The term *burden sharing* has come to be applied to a variety of issues related to the defense spending of NATO nations. Burden sharing refers to issues of equity—that is, how national effort on behalf of the alliance is to be measured and compared with the efforts of fellow alliance members.

In Belgium, as in other NATO nations, the desire to keep taxes down and to facilitate continued investment in civil technologies and industrial renovation has set limits on increased defense expenditures. Belgium has nevertheless increased defense spending at a rate equal to or greater than many of its NATO allies. Defense spending in 1982 reached the equivalent of US$2.9 billion, a 46-percent increase since 1971. This represented an overall 17.7-percent increase in defense spending as a portion of GDP since 1971. Despite the economic hardship of the late 1970s, Belgium has continued to support the NATO alliance.

In December 1979 the members of NATO decided to modernize the Europe-based United States nuclear arsenal by deploying 572 new ground-launched missile systems in Western Europe that were capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The deployment would consist of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all armed with single nuclear warheads. The missiles were to be deployed in five countries: the Pershing IIs and some cruise missiles in West Germany and cruise missiles only in Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The NATO allies also agreed to attempt negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to limit further nuclear deployment in Europe. The NATO decision was an integrated, or dual-track, approach involving both modernization and arms control negotiation.

During the consultations that preceded the NATO decision, the Belgian coalition government was described as supportive of the proposed missile deployment. The NATO ministers expected the government to endorse the proposal and accept the missile deployment on Belgian territory. Domestic opposition, especially from the Dutch-speaking Socialist Party (SP), however, caused the government to condition its support for the deployment policy. Belgium endorsed the decision to modernize the nu-

clear capability of NATO but wavered on its applicability to Belgian territory. The government was unable to concentrate fully on the issue of deployment in 1979 because of its preoccupation with linguistic and economic issues (see The Language Cleavage, 1917–80 ch. 1; Patterns of Development, ch. 3). In September 1980, however, the government issued an ambiguous "non-decision" that allowed supporters and opponents of deployment to claim victory. Belgian acceptance was linked to progress in the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF), negotiations being conducted by the United States and NATO with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. If the negotiations did not succeed in lessening tensions between the states, then Belgium would, "in concert with its Allies, take all the measures agreed upon by the NATO partners (in 1979)," i.e., would allow the missiles to be stationed on Belgian territory. There would also be semiannual review of this 1980 policy until a firm decision could be made. In late 1984 the policy was still under review.

The SP continued to be the political group most strongly opposed to deployment. It made opposition to deployment one of its reasons for participating in the government, and its leaders have made a considerable political investment in the issue. The leader of the SP, Karel Van Miert, saw the initial NATO decision as an example of overwhelming American pressure on the Europeans and stressed that deployment in Belgium be linked to a possible INF agreement with the Soviet Union. However, the underlying rationale for opposition by the SP may have been lack of economic gain to the Dutch-speaking areas of Belgium. The opposition may also have been mounted as a reaction to the strong antinuclear sentiment in neighboring countries, namely, the Netherlands and West Germany. The French-speaking Socialist Party (PS) has not seriously opposed deployment. The lack of PS opposition may have been positively influenced by the economic benefits to Wallonia that would result from deployment in that region.

Because of the fragility of coalition politics, as well as the continued economic strain in late 1984, the Belgian government was still unable to make a firm decision on cruise missile deployment. It has nonetheless taken initial steps to implement the plan, including the selection and construction of a site for the missiles at Florennes. A large number of Belgian officials continued to support the NATO dual-track decision and stressed Belgian willingness to counteract any increased Soviet threat to Western Europe. Nevertheless, in late 1984 it seemed likely that the government would continue to postpone a final decision as long as possible.

Public Order

Three kinds of police exist in Belgium—the gendarmerie, the Criminal Police, and a number of commune police forces. There also exists a parish constable system in the rural areas.

Internal Security

The gendarmerie is one of the armed forces of Belgium but is not part of the army. Apart from having a general headquarters and a training school, it is organized into territorial groups, mobile groups, and criminal investigation detachments. Its main functions are the investigation of crimes, the escorting of prisoners, preventive police work, the restoration and maintenance of public order, the enforcement of traffic laws, and military police duties. Although the gendarmerie has jurisdiction over the entire country, it normally operates only in those areas outside the jurisdiction of a municipal police force. For operational purposes the country is divided into five regions, each of which covers two provinces and is commanded by a colonel. Within each region are two territorial groups (only one in Brussels) and a mobile group commanded by a major or a lieutenant colonel.

Each of the nine territorial groups covers a province and is divided into a number of districts. There is also a section of traffic police attached to each territorial group. Each district is divided into brigades, which are each composed of a warrant officer and at least six other officers, often considerably more. These brigades are scattered over the whole country, each covering one or more rural communities. A surveillance and investigation detachment is also assigned to each district for investigating crimes and collecting intelligence related to public order. Its members work in civilian clothes.

The standard uniform of the gendarmerie consists of a blue uniform and cap with red piping on the trouser legs, cuffs, and caps. Red collar tabs bear gendarmerie insignia and, in the case of officers, insignia of rank. To this uniform is added a Sam Browne belt, which carries the standard 9mm automatic pistol as well as a billy club. This uniform is similar to that worn by the municipal police except that the latter have silver, not red, embellishments.

The gendarmerie is under the command of the Ministry of National Defense, but its officers are also answerable to the Ministry of the Interior and Public Office for the enforcement of certain laws and for public order matters. They are also answerable to the Ministry of Justice and Institutional Reform for criminal and investigative matters.

A member of the commune police in an area of Brussels
Courtesy Belgium Information and Documentation Institute

The commune police have primary jurisdiction in all important towns. There are 345 such local police units. They are responsible for the enforcement of criminal and general police statutes within the town boundaries. On criminal matters, municipal police officers work under the direction of the royal prosecutor, but for general police duties, such as the enforcement of local bylaws and traffic regulations, they are answerable to the mayor. The larger units have special sections that deal with criminal or traffic offenses as well as the normal uniformed patrols. Municipal detectives work strictly in accordance with their instructions from the local police commissioners and the mayor.

Commune police officers wear a dark blue uniform and a peaked cap. They are authorized to carry either a 7.65mm automatic pistol or a .38-caliber revolver.

The Rural Police exists in small country towns and villages. Each village has one or more constables. Larger towns that have a broad agricultural area within their boundaries may also have a rural constable attached to their commune police force. One parish constable may look after several communities if the total population does not exceed 5,000.

Parish constables are responsible to the mayor for general duties and to the royal prosecutor for criminal matters. They are able to deal with all police matters--crimes, general police duties, and traffic. Their competence in criminal matters is limited, however, to certain offenses such as poaching and other rural crimes.

The Criminal Police is concerned exclusively with breaches of the criminal law. The personnel are placed under the authority and control of the public prosecutor attached to the appeals courts and under the day-to-day command of the royal prosecutor for the judicial area in which the brigade works. The Criminal Police deals only with the most serious crimes and is also responsible for the maintenance of national criminal records.

Crime and Justice

Criminal justice in minor cases is administered by justices of the peace, by the local police, or by the police courts in 222 judicial cantons. Misdemeanors and other more serious cases are tried before the 26 district courts, the tribunals of first instance. A person charged with a grave crime is tried before an assize court and jury as well as a judge. Verdicts of the lower courts may be appealed before the five appellate courts; verdicts of the assizes courts may be reviewed by the Court of Cassation (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). Although it has changed over the years, the criminal code retains its nineteenth-century character based on the Napoleonic code.

Records of the administration of justice are carefully prepared and, as a result, criminal statistics are released after three years of compilation and analysis. Official documents published in 1982 and 1983 have been updated to include data from 1978. During that year about 194,000 petty offenses, some 60,500 misdemeanors, and 48 serious crimes were brought to trial. Approximately 6,400 cases were referred to the lower appellate courts and about 1,200 cases were reviewed by the Court of Cassation.

Justices of the peace and the police courts have the authority to levy fines and, if required, impose short-term jail sentences. Of the 194,000 cases presented at this judicial level in 1978, approximately 9 percent were dismissed without trial or acquitted. Of the 175,000 cases that were judged guilty, about 99 percent were for petty crimes classified as police cases--public inebriation, disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, simple assault, and minor traffic violations. The remaining number included convictions for vagrancy, truancy, and failure to vote (a legal offense in Belgium).

Approximately 3,800 of those found guilty were sentenced to prison terms. More than one-half of these were granted a condi-



A city policeman in Bruges wearing the shield of the province of West Flanders on his pocket. Photo courtesy Robert Rinehart

tional sentence under which confinement was intermittent. For example, if a person was sentenced to six days of confinement but it was determined that incarceration would create undue financial hardship for the family of the prisoner, an arrangement could be made to allow the prisoner to serve the sentence on weekends. Similar conditional arrangements were allowed for the payment of judicial fines and penalties. This might entail a deduction from wages, time payments, or community service in lieu of a fine. Those convicted of begging or vagrancy were not ordinarily fined or jailed but placed "at the disposition of the government." They were then required to participate in rehabilitation programs.

District courts—those with jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases—are empowered to hand down sentences of up to five years of imprisonment or to impose an equivalent fine. In 1978 those courts acquitted approximately 12 percent of the 60,000 accused.

Of the 53,500 who were found guilty, 65 percent were fined; of the 18,000 sentenced to prison, approximately two-thirds of the sentences were conditional.

The superior courts—those with trial by judge and jury--are empowered to hand down more severe sentences. About 25 percent of the cases presented to the superior court in 1978 were acquitted. Of those convicted, more than half were sentenced to hard labor. Eight persons were sentenced to solitary confinement. A few others were sentenced to prison terms without a determination of special kinds of treatment. Five were sentenced to hard labor for life. None were sentenced to death. Death sentences in peacetime are usually commuted by the king to life imprisonment.

Of the approximately 6,500 petty cases and misdemeanors brought before the appellate courts, about 2,400 of the original verdicts were upheld. Some of the original verdicts were invalidated; in most cases, however, the sentence was simply altered. The Court of Cassation returned about 900 of the 1,150 criminal cases it reviewed to the lower courts for retrial. It rescinded the lower court verdicts in 150 cases and took action of its own in 87 cases.

Belgian prisons have an international reputation for cleanliness, satisfactory food, efficient management, and effective rehabilitation programs. Statistics about the prison population are misleading, however, as the figures appear to indicate a high degree of recidivism—about 40 percent. This impression is the result of distortions owing to the conditional sentencing of many first-time inmates and the short duration of a number of the sentences.

Freedom from torture and from cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment is guaranteed by law and respected in practice. The Belgian Constitution provides that "no person may be prosecuted except in cases laid down by the law and in the form it prescribes" and "no penalty may be decreed or applied save in accordance with the law." The Belgian Penal Code prohibits the deliberate mistreatment or injury of another and is applicable to the actions of both officials and private individuals. There are no differences in the conditions of confinement based on race, sex, religion, or social class.

Since the late 1960s, political violence has not been a major problem in Belgium. The street riots caused by the fractious linguistic debate have not recurred, nor have there been any major incidents of political terrorism characteristic throughout much of Europe. However, in late 1984 a series of terrorist bombings near

Brussels and Antwerp were directed at NATO defense suppliers and at the offices of moderate political parties. Responsibility for the attacks was claimed by a left-wing splinter group called the Communist Combative Cells, and in late 1984 Wilfried Martens' fifth coalition government (Martens V)—in concert with France, the Netherlands, and West Germany—vowed to arrest and prosecute the terrorists. The Benelux Extradition and Judicial Assistance Treaty of 1962 provided a framework for regional cooperation in criminal matters and also facilitated joint activity in the event of political terrorism in the Benelux region.

* * *

Thorough studies of Belgian military capabilities are difficult to find in English. Because of the integration of Belgian forces into the NATO military structure, however, much information is available in analyses of the alliance as well as in comparative threat and force assessments with the Warsaw Pact. The research reports of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, contain much information useful to scholars of Belgian military activities. *The Military Balance*, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the various Jane's publications are sources of personnel strength and weapons information. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix A

Table

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Dutch and French Names of Provinces, Arrondissements, and Selected Rivers[1]

Dutch	French	French	Dutch
		Provinces	
Antwerpen[2]	Anvers[2]	Anvers[2]	*Antwerpen*[2]
Brabant	Brabant	Brabant	*Brabant*
Henegouwen	*Hainaut*	Flandre Occidentale	*West-Vlaanderen*
Limburg	Limbourg	Flandre Orientale	*Oost-Vlaanderen*
Luik	*Liège*	*Hainaut*	Henegouwen
Luxemburg	*Luxembourg*	*Liège*	Luik
Namen	*Namur*	Limbourg	*Limburg*
Oost-Vlaanderen	Flandre Orientale	*Luxembourg*	Luxemburg
West-Vlaanderen	Flandre Occidentale	*Namur*	Namen
		Arrondissements	
Aalst	Alost	Alost	*Aaslst*
Aarlen	*Arlon*	Anvers[2]	*Antwerpen*[2]
Aat	*Ath*	*Arlon*	Aarlen
Antwerpen[2]	Anvers[2]	*Ath*	Aat
Bastenaken	*Bastogne*	Audenarde	*Oudenaarde*
Bergen	*Mons*	*Bastogne*	Bastenaken
Borgworm	*Waremme*	Bruges	*Brugge*
Brugge	Bruges	Bruxelles[3]	Brussel[3]
Brussel[3]	Bruxelles[3]	*Charleroi*	Charleroi
Charleroi	*Charleroi*	Courtrai	*Kortrijk*
Dendermonde	Termonde	*Dinant*	Dinant
Diksmuide	Dixmude	Dixmude	*Diksmuide*
Dinant	*Dinant*	Eeklo	*Eeklo*
Doornik	*Tournai*	Furnes	*Veurne*
Eeklo	Eeklo	Gand[4]	*Gent*[4]
Gent[4]	Gand[4]	Hal-Vilvorde	*Halle-Vilvoorde*
Halle-Vilvoorde	Hal-Vilvorde	Hasselt	*Hasselt*
Hasselt	Hasselt	*Huy*	Hoei
Hoei	*Huy*	*Liège*	Luik
Ieper	Ypres	Louvain	*Leuven*
Kortrijk	Courtrai	Maaseik	*Maaseik*
Leuven	Louvain	Malines	*Mechelen*
Luik	*Liège*	*Marche-en-Famenne*	Marche-en-Famenne
Maaseik	Maaseik	*Mons*	Bergen
Marche-en-Famenne	*Marche-en-Famenne*	*Mouscron*	Moeskroen
Mechelen	Malines	*Namur*	Namen
Moeskroen	*Mouscron*	*Neufchâteau*	Neufchâteau
Namen	*Namur*	*Nivelles*	Nijvel
Neufchâteau	*Neufchâteau*	Ostende	*Oostende*
Nijvel	*Nivelles*	*Philippeville*	Philippeville
Oostende	Ostende	Roulers	*Roeselare*

Table 2. (Continued).

Dutch	French	French	Dutch
		Arrondissements	
Oudenaarde	Audenarde	Saint-Nicolas	*Sint-Niklaas*
Philippeville	*Phillippevile*	*Soignies*	Zinnik
Roeselare	Roulers	Termonde	*Dendermonde*
Sint-Niklaas	Saint-Nicolas	*Thuin*	Thuin
Thuin	*Thuin*	Tielt	*Tielt*
Tielt	Tielt	Tongres	*Tongeren*
Tongeren	Tongres	*Tournai*	Doornik
Turnhout	Turnhout	Turnhout	*Turnhout*
Verviers	*Verviers*	*Verviers*	Verviers
Veurne	Furnes	*Virton*	Virton
Virton	*Virton*	*Waremme*	Borgworm
Zinnik	*Soignies*	Ypres	*Ieper*
		Rivers	
Dender	Dendre	Dendre	*Dender*
Dijle	Dyle	Dyle	*Dijle*
Leie	Lys	Escaut	*Schelde*
Maas	*Meuse*	Lys	*Leie*
Schelde	Escaut	*Meuse*	Maas

[1]Italics indicate preferred version because the province, arrondissement, or river is located primarily in the Dutch-speaking or the French-speaking area.
[2]Conventional English version is Antwerp.
[3]Conventional English version is Brussels; Brussels is bilingual and therefore has no preferred version.
[4]Conventional English version is Ghent.

Table 3. Population and Population Change by Provinces and Arrondissement, 1970–81[1]

Province Arrondissement	Population 1970	 1981	Percent Change 1970–81
Antwerpen			
Antwerpen	917,559	918,144	0.1
Mechelen	287,713	292,325	1.6
Turnhout	332,728	359,407	8.0
Total Antwerpen	1,538,000	1,569,876	2.1
Brabant			
Brussels	1,075,136	997,293	-7.2
Halle-Vilvoorde	472,030	518,191	9.8
Leuven	389,460	414,729	6.5
Nivelles	234,328	291,009	24.2
Total Brabant	2,170,954	2,221,222	2.3
Hainaut			
Ath	78,335	77,291	-1.3
Charleroi	456,716	443,832	-2.8
Mons	261,078	257,234	-1.5
Mouscron	72,198	72,674	0.7
Soignies	164,925	167,238	1.4
Thuin	139,222	141,442	1.6
Tournai	144,474	141,766	1.9
Total Hainaut	1,316,948	1,301,477	-1.2
Liège			
Huy	85,868	88,221	2.7
Liège	618,229	605,123	-2.1
Verviers	239,242	245,260	2.5
Waremme	59,401	60,809	2.4
Total Liège	1,002,740	999,413	-0.3
Limburg			
Hasselt	319,559	352,707	10.4
Maaseik	166,619	187,771	12.7
Tongeren	166,369	176,410	6.0
Total Limburg	652,547	716,888	9.9
Luxembourg			
Arlon	47,586	47,311	-0.6
Bastogne	36,438	36,199	-0.7
Marche-en-Famenne	39,437	42,697	8.3
Neufchâteau	51,344	51,488	0.3
Virton	43,149	44,231	2.5
Total Luxembourg	217,954	221,926	1.8

Table 3. (Continued).

Province Arrondissement	Population 1970	 1981	Percent Change 1970–81
Namur			
Dinant	86,592	88,924	2.7
Namur	245,472	261,054	6.3
Philippeville	55,191	57,422	4.0
Total Namur	387,255	407,400	5.2
Oost-Vlaanderen			
Aalst	263,842	262,469	-0.5
Dendermonde	175,530	180,617	2.9
Eeklo	78,561	79,924	1.7
Gent	479,152	485,565	1.3
Oudenaarde	113,845	112,501	-1.2
Sint-Niklaas	199,185	210,116	1.6.
Total Oost-Vlaanderen	1,310,115	1,331,192	1.6
West-Vlaanderen			
Brugge	241,813	254,221	5.1
Diksmuide	49,191	47,680	-3.1
Ieper	105,214	103,893	-1.3
Kortrijk	263,840	271,613	2.9
Oostende	130,043	132,204	1.7
Roeselare	133,670	137,035	2.5
Tielt	83,645	84,727	1.3
Veurne	47,015	47,880	1.8
Total West-Vlaanderen	1,054,431	1,079,253	2.4
TOTAL BELGIUM[2]	9,650,944	9,848,647	2.1
Flanders	5,416,583	5,630,129	3.9
Wallonia	3,159,225	3,221,225	2.0
German-speaking area of Wallonia	61,972	64,914	4.7

[1]For definition of arrondissement—see Glossary.

[2]Includes Flanders (provinces of Antwerpen, Limburg, Oost-Vlaanderen, and West-Vlaanderen and arrondissements of Leuven and Halle-Vilvoorde in province of Brabant), Wallonia (the rest of Belgium except for Brussels, which is bilingual), and Brussels.

Source: Based on information from Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Institute National de Statistique, *Annuaire de statistiques regionales*, Brussels, 1982, 11.

Table 4. Revenue, Expenditure, and Net Financing Requirement of the Central Government and Local Authorities, Selected Years, 1977–83
(in billions of Belgian francs; figures in parentheses indicate percentage of gross national product)[1]

	1977	1979	1981	1982	1983
Revenue					
Direct taxes	482	608	655	768	774
Indirect taxes	355	413	457	498	535
Social security contributions	378	425	489	521	577
Capital taxes	10	13	13	12	13
Nonfiscal revenue	39	45	74	89	86
Total revenue	1,264	1,504	1,688	1,888	1,985
	(44.4)	(46.2)	(46.6)	(48.4)	(47.9)
Expenditure					
Current expenditure					
Net expenditure on wages, goods, and services	456	535	637	677	691
Interest charges	116	165	287	361	384
Unemployment and job-creation	68	104	152	166	191
Social security transfers to individuals	524	619	724	778	831
Subsidies to enterprises[2]	95	111	128	135	144
Net current transfers to rest of world	35	44	46	58	63
Total current expenditure	1,294	1,578	1,974	2,175	2,304

Table 4. (Continued).

	1977	1979	1981	1982	1983
Expenditure (*cont'd*)					
Capital expenditure					
Net capital transfers	77	92	154	166	171
Investments	110	124	146	151	147
Total capital expenditure	187	216	300	317	318
Total expenditure	1,481	1,794	2,274	2,492	2,622
	(52.0)	(55.1)	(62.8)	(63.9)	(63.2)
Net financing requirement	-217	-290	-586	-604	-637
	(7.6)	(8.9)	(16.2)	(15.5)	(15.3)
Net financing requirement of central government	(6.1)	(6.8)	(12.6)	(13.0)	(12.6)

[1]For value of the Belgian franc—see Glossary.

[2]Primarily represents operating losses of public enterprises, i.e., railroads, urban transport, SABENA, Post Office, and Postal Chèque Service.

Source: Based on information from National Bank of Belgium, *Report for 1983*, Brussels, February 1984, 128–29; Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Economiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *L'économie belge en 1983*, 1, Brussels, 1984, 78; and Belgium Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *L' économie belge en 1982*, 1, Brussels, 1983, 222, 430–31.

Table 5. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) and Foreign Investment, 1975–83
(in billions of Belgian francs)*

	1975–77	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
GFCF (in constant 1975 prices)	1,573.0	547.0	548.0	557.0	470.0	455.0	438.0
GFCF (in current prices)	1,573.0	654.0	684.0	729.0	640.0	659.0	665.0
Public authorities	303.0	113.0	124.0	144.0	146.0	151.0	147.0
(percentage of GFCF)	(18.0)	(17.3)	(18.1)	(19.8)	(22.8)	(22.9)	(22.1)
Individuals	544.0	283.0	266.0	279.0	187.0	184.0	182.0
Corporate sector							
Foreign and mixed investment in new enterprises							
Flanders	12.0	5.6	8.6	2.2	4.9	4.0	n.a.
Wallonia	12.8	4.2	1.1	1.2	0.2	2.2	n.a.
Brussels	5.8	2.4	1.0	2.4	3.5	2.6	n.a.
Subtotal	30.6	12.2	10.7	5.8	8.6	8.8	n.a.
Other corporate investment	696.4	245.8	283.3	300.2	298.4	315.2	n.a.
Total corporate sector	727.0	258.0	294.0	306.0	307.0	324.0	336.0

n.a.--not available.

*For value of the Belgian franc—see Glossary.

Table 6. Distribution of Economically Active Population, 1970–81 (in percentage)

Sector	1970	1979	1981	Average Annual Change 1970–81
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	4.5	2.9	2.6	-3.52
Energy and water	2.3	1.5	1.5	-2.59
Extraction and processing of noncombustible ores; chemical industry	7.4	5.3	4.9	-2.43
Metal processing, mechanical engineering, metalworking, and other manufacturing industries	24.7	17.5	16.2	-2.57
Construction and civil engineering	8.0	7.2	6.2	-1.10
Transportation and communications	6.4	6.6	6.6	1.54
Commerce, food, lodging, and repair services; financial and insurance institutions	21.0	22.9	22.8	1.96
Other services, including career military and civil service	20.6	27.3	27.8	4.00
Military service	0.9	0.7	0.8	-0.46
Unemployed[1]	2.2	7.0	9.6	15.70
Other[2]	2.0	1.1	1.0	-4.70
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	
TOTAL NUMBER (in thousands)	3,638	4,138	4,161	

[1]Includes compensated unemployed and unemployed registered with the National Office of Employment.
[2]Includes commuters from Belgium to neighboring countries, personnel employed with international organizations outside Belgium, and interns in professions.

Source: Based on information from Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *L'économie belge en 1982*, 1, Brussels, 1983, 18; and Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Institut National de Statistique, *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique*, 102, Brussels, 1983, 525.

Table 7. Unemployment by Area, 1982

Area	Men		Women		Total	
	Actual[1]	Rate[2]	Actual[1]	Rate[2]	Actual[1]	Rate[2]
Province						
Antwerpen	32.2	11.1	38.1	24.9	70.3	15.9
Brabant	45.7	12.9	48.5	19.9	94.2	13.4
Hainaut	30.3	15.4	34.0	29.2	64.3	20.6
Liège	23.0	14.4	30.6	29.9	53.6	20.5
Limburg	14.7	11.9	31.5	42.7	46.2	23.4
Luxembourg	2.9	11.0	3.2	22.1	6.1	14.9
Namur	8.2	15.5	8.4	25.7	16.6	19.4
Oost-Vlaanderen	20.9	12.2	23.5	23.1	44.4	16.2
West-Vlaanderen	28.8	13.0	32.0	24.0	60.8	17.1
Region						
Flanders	112.5	11.7	145.8	25.9	258.3	16.9
Wallonia	68.8	14.3	81.4	27.8	150.2	19.4
Brussels	25.5	16.6	22.6	19.2	48.1	17.7

[1]In thousands. Includes unemployed registered with the National Office of Employment and the compensated fully unemployed. Excludes those participating in government employment programs.
[2]As percentage of those insured against unemployment.

Source: Based on information from Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *L' économie belge en 1982*, 1, Brussels, 1983, 31–32.

Table 8. Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union Composition of Merchandise Trade, Selected Years, 1975–82
(in percentage of total value)

Sector	Exports				Imports			
	1975	1980	1981	1982	1975	1980	1981	1982
Agricultural, forestry, and fishing products	3.4	2.7	2.8	2.8	7.5	5.9	6.2	6.4
Fuels and energy products	4.8	8.3	8.9	8.5	14.0	17.2	20.4	20.5
Minerals, ores, and nonferrous metals	22.1	20.5	18.1	17.6	13.7	13.3	12.4	11.5
Metal products, machniery, and transportation equipment								
Automobiles, automobile engines, and other transportation equipment	10.8	10.9	11.3	12.5	11.9	11.3	11.1	11.6
Agricultural and industrial machinery	8.5	6.5	6.3	5.8	7.3	5.7	5.0	5.1
Electrical products	5.6	5.0	4.9	4.4	6.0	4.9	4.7	4.3
Office machines, computers, precision and optical instruments	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.0
Other	2.7	2.3	2.3	2.3	3.0	2.7	2.4	2.3
Subtotal	28.5	25.6	25.8	26.2	30.0	26.4	25.0	25.3

Table 8.(Continued).

Sector	Exports				Imports			
	1975	1980	1981	1982	1975	1980	1981	1982
Food, beverages, and tobacco	7.3	7.2	8.4	8.7	6.3	6.1	6.2	6.7
Textiles, leather, and shoes	9.7	7.6	7.2	7.1	7.6	6.8	6.2	6.2
Wood industry, paper, and printing	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.3
Chemicals, rubber, and plastics	15.5	16.9	17.5	18.0	11.7	11.7	11.9	12.5
Other	4.3	7.0	7.1	7.0	4.6	7.9	7.2	6.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (in billions of Belgian francs—see Glossary	1,057	1,890	2,062	2,395	1,131	2,101	2,310	2,642

*For value of the Belgian franc—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *L'économie belge en 1982*, 1, Brussels, 1983, 392–93; and Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Economiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *L'économie belge en 1979*, 1, Brussels, 1980, 400–401.

Table 9. Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) Balance of Payments on Transactions Basis, Selected Years, 1975–82[1] (in billions of Belgian francs)[2]

	1975	1977	1979	1981	1982
Trade balance	-32.2	-110.1	-139.5	-175.8	-169.9
Commission processing	15.8	40.9	47.4	41.5	54.2
Third-country trade[3]	16.8	25.7	18.5	25.0	24.3
Services					
Transport[4]	6.9	9.8	10.6	14.8	26.5
Foreign travel	-20.1	-26.1	-39.2	-46.9	-28.0
Portfolio and investment income	16.4	19.2	10.4	-3.2	-9.6
Transactions of public authorities not included elsewhere[5]	16.4	25.1	26.9	36.9	43.1
Other[6]	9.8	20.2	3.9	0.5	- 5.0
Total services	29.4	48.2	12.6	2.1	27.0
Transfers					
Public[7]	-19.8	-18.8	-18.3	-33.0	-44.9
Private[8]	- 4.0	- 5.8	-10.1	-15.3	-11.0
Total transfers	-23.8	-24.6	-28.4	-48.3	-55.9
Current account balance	6.0	-19.9	-89.4	-155.5	-120.3
Long-term capital[9]					
Private	- 6.6	-10.0	17.8	95.3	-16.0
Public	3.3	- 0.8	- 2.5	43.0	78.8
Total long-term capital	- 9.9	-10.8	15.3	138.3	62.8
Basic balance	- 3.9	-30.7	-74.1	-17.2	-57.5
Nonmonetary short-term private capital	-14.2	9.7	-16.1	-102.8	- 5.5
Nonmonetary short-term public capital	0.6	1.2	7.2	62.5	39.6
Errors and ommissions	13.8	11.0	-11.3	- 3.0	- 2.6
Balance on nonmonetary transactions	-3.7	-8.8	-94.3	-60.5	-26.0
Change in National Bank of Belgium's foreign exchange reserves	18.0	- 9.0	-31.0	-96.0	-38.0

[1] Includes, since 1977, transactions settled by offsetting.

[2] For value of the Belgian franc—see Glossary.

[3] Goods bought and resold abroad by Belgian companies.

[4] Freight and insurance for goods transport that could be identified separately from exports and imports.

[5] Includes the operating expenditure of BLEU.

[6] Includes contracting, technical assistance, management services, and patent fees.

[7] Mainly consists on the debit side of development assistance and contributions to European institutions and, on the credit side, of payments made by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund to Belgian farmers.

[8] Mainly consists on the debit side of funds tranferred to their countries of origin by foreign workers and, on the credit side, of remittances of Belgians working abroad.

[9] In BLEU statistics, a distinction is not always made between direct investment and other capital or between long-term and short-term capital.

Table 10. Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) Geographical Distribution of Trade, Selected Years, 1977–83
(in percentage)

	1977	1981	1982	1983[1]
Exports				
EEC[2]				
West Germany	22.4	20.1	20.4	21.3
France	19.1	19.2	19.4	18.2
Netherlands	16.8	14.8	14.2	14.3
Other[3]	13.5	15.8	16.6	16.2
Total EEC	71.8	69.9	70.6	70.0
Other Western Europe	8.7	8.5	8.6	8.2
Western Hemisphere				
United States	4.2	4.2	4.4	5.1
Other	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.2
Total Western Hemisphere	5.6	5.8	5.7	6.3
Oil-exporting countries[4]				
Saudi Arabia	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3
Other	4.0	4.0	3.2	2.7
Total oil-exporting countries	4.9	5.2	4.4	4.0
Asia and Oceania	2.8	3.5	4.1	4.2
Eastern Europe	2.2	2.1	1.8	2.1
Africa	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1
Other	1.8	2.8	2.6	3.1
Total exports	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (in billions of Belgian francs)[5]	1344.7	2062.3	2394.5	2650.8
Imports				
EEC[2]				
West Germany	22.2	18.8	19.9	20.7
France	15.9	13.7	13.9	14.1
Netherlands	16.9	16.8	17.4	17.8
Other[3]	12.8	11.7	11.6	13.2
Total EEC	67.8	61.0	62.8	65.8
Other Western Europe	5.5	8.0	7.1	7.8
Western Hemisphere				
United States	6.0	7.1	7.0	6.7
Other	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.5
Total Western Hemisphere	8.5	9.6	9.7	9.2
Oil-exporting countries[4]				
Saudi Arabia[6]	3.8	7.1	4.4	2.8
Other	4.6	2.7	4.0	3.5
Total oil-exporting countries	8.4	9.8	8.4	6.3
Asia and Oceania	4.0	4.4	4.1	4.4
Eastern Europe	1.8	2.3	3.2	2.9
Africa	3.4	3.4	3.4	2.6
Other	0.6	1.5	1.3	1.0

Table 10. (Continued).

	1977	1981	1982	1983
Total imports	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (in billion of Belgian francs)	1448.0	2309.8	2642.3	2817.1[4]

[1]Calculations based on data extrapolated from 11 months of reported trade statistics.
[2]European Economic Community.
[3]Includes Greece as of January 1, 1981.
[4]Includes Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
[5]For value of the Belgian franc—see Glossary.
[6]Adjustments made for BF51 billion of oil imports not accounted for in official statistics because of a misunderstanding regarding new customs documents introduced in May 1983.

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1983*, Washington, 1984, 90–92; Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *L'économie belge en 1982*, 1, Brussels, 1983, 408–409; and Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Économiques, Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation, *Aperçu économique trimestriel*, Brussels, No. 2, June 1984, 11–12.

Table 11. Gross Value Added by Sector, Selected Years, 1975–82 (in percentage of total value)

Sector	1975	1977	1979	1981	1982
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	2.9	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.4
Extractive industries	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
Manufacturing					
Food, beverages, and tobacco	5.3	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.8
Textiles	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
Clothing and shoes	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6
Wood and furniture	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1
Paper, printing, and publishing	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
Chemicals	2.5	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.0
Clay, ceramics, glass, and cement	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.0
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.3	1.2
Metalworking and shipbuilding	8.3	8.3	7.4	6.5	6.5
Other	3.2	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4
Total manufacturing	27.5	26.8	25.8	23.9	24.0
Construction	7.2	7.5	7.2	6.3	6.0
Electricity, gas, and water	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.6	3.5
Commerce and finance	26.3	27.5	27.8	28.7	29.0
Transportation and communications	7.7	7.7	8.0	8.5	8.6
Other services	25.7	26.8	27.7	29.0	28.8
Statistical adjustment[1]	-1.2	-2.3	-2.4	-2.8	-2.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Gross domestic product at market prices[2]	2,313	2,867	3,258	3,644	3,940

[1]Includes corrections for self-financing, the value added tax deductible on investment, and other related financial transactions.

[2]In billions of Belgian francs; for value of the Belgian franc—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Banque Nationale de Belgique, *Bulletin de la Banque Nationale de Belgique*, Brussels, 1, No. 2, February 1984, 7.

Table 12. Coalition Governments, 1973–84

Period of Office	Prime Minister's Cabinet and His Party Affiliation	Coalition Parties[1]
January 1973-January 1974	Edmond Leburton (CVP)	CVP/PSC-SP/PS-PVV/PRL
April-June 1974	Leo Tindemans I (CVP)	CVP/PSC-PVV/PRL
June 1974-April 1977	Tindemans II[2]	CVP/PSC-PVV/PRL-RW
June 1977-October 1978	Tindemans III	CVP/PSC-SP/PS-FDF-VU
October 1978-April 1979[3]	Paul Vanden Boeynants II[4] (PSC)	CVP/PSC-SP/PS-FDF-VU
April-December 1979	Wilfried Martens I (CVP)	CVP/PSC-SP/PS-FDF
January-April 1980	Martens II	CVP/PSC-SP/PS
May-October 1980	Martens III	CVP/PSC-SP/PS-PVV/PRL
October 1980-March 1981	Martens IV	CVP/PSC-SP/PS
April-November 1981	Mark Eyskens (CVP)	CVP/PSC-SP/PS
December 1981–	Martens V	CVP/PSC-PVV/PRL

[1]For full names of political parties, see Table A, p. xiii.
[2]Cabinet was reorganized to include the Walloon Rally (RW).
[3]Between February and April 1979, four different political leaders failed to form a coalition government.
[4]Vanden Boeynants' first cabinet was in office between 1966 and 1968.

Table 13. Elections to the House of Representatives, 1965–81[1]

Party Number of Seats Percentage of Votes	1965	1968	1971		1974	1977	1978	1981
CVP/PSC								
Seats	77.0	69.0	67.0	CVP	50.0	56.0	57.0	43.0
Votes	34.4	31.7	30.0		32.3[2]	26.2	26.1	19.3
Seats				PSC	22.0	24.0	25.0	18.0
Votes					n.a.	9.8	10.1	7.1
SP/PS								
Seats	64.0	59.0	61.0	SP	26.0	27.0	26.0	26.0
Votes	28.3	28.0	27.3		26.7[2]	13.0	13.0	12.4
Seats				PS	33.0	35.0	32.0	35.0
Votes					n.a.	13.4	12.4	12.7
PVV/PRL								
Seats	48.0	47.0	34.0	PVV	33.0[3]	33.0[3]	22.0[3]	28.0[3]
Votes	22.0	21.0	16.7		15.2[2]	15.5[2]	10.3	12.9
Seats				PRL	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Votes					n.a.	n.a.	6.0	8.6
VU								
Seats	12.0	20.0	21.0		22.0	20.0	14.0	20.0
Votes	6.4	9.8	11.0		10.2	10.0	7.0	9.8
KPB/PSB								
Seats	6.0	5.0	5.0		4.0	2.0	4.0	2.0
Votes	4.6	3.3	3.2		3.2	2.7	2.7	2.3
FDF								
Seats	3.0				0.9	10.0	11.0	
Votes	1.3				5.1	4.7	4.3	
		12.0[4]	24.0[4]					8.0[4]
RW								
Seats	---[5]	5.9	11.4		13.0	5.0	4.0	4.2
Votes	---[5]				5.9	2.4	2.7	
Agalev/Ecolo								
Seats	---[5]	---[5]	---[5]		---[5]	---[5]	0	4.0
Votes	---[5]	---[5]	---[5]		---[5]	---[5]	0.8	4.5
VB								
Seats	---[5]	---[5]	---[5]		---[5]	---[5]	1.0	1.0
Votes	---[5]	---[5]	---[5]		---[5]	---[6]	---[6]	1.1
RAD/UDRT								
Seats	---[5]	---[5]	---[5]		---[5]	0	0	3.0
Votes	---[5]	---[5]	---[5]		---[5]	---[6]	---[6]	2.7
Others								
Seats	2.0	0	0		0	0	0	0
Votes	3.0	0.3	0.4		1.4	2.3	4.6	2.4

n.a.--not available.

[1]Election results for the Senate are roughly proportionate to those for the lower house and hence are not shown.

[2]Includes percentage votes for other party.

[3]Includes seats for other party.

[4]Aggregate results for joint lists.

[5]Party did not exist in that year.

[6]Aggregate figures shown in "Other" category.

Appendix B

The European Communities

The complex and ever-changing institutions that make up the European Communities (EC—more and more commonly called the European Community) form more than a framework for free trade and economic cooperation. The signatories to the treaties governing the community have agreed in principle to integrate their economies and ultimately to form a political union. Frequent strong opposition from both the public and concerned politicians does not detract from the founders' intentions, born in the aftermath of World War II, to create a peaceful union of formerly hostile states.

The EC is actually a merger of three separate communities. The first, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was established by a treaty signed in Paris on April 18, 1951. After several false starts to expand the community, the original members agreed to form the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) by treaties signed in Rome on March 25, 1957. The EEC and EURATOM modeled their governing institutions on those of the ECSC. Another treaty, signed in Brussels on April 8, 1965, planned the merger of the institutions governing all three communities, which was achieved slightly more than two years later.

The governing bodies of the EC act under guidelines from any of the community treaties as necessary. The provisions of the EEC treaty are the broadest of the three treaties: the elimination of all barriers to trade and to the movement of persons, services, and capital; the development of common policies on trade, agriculture, and transportation; the regulation of fair business practices; the harmonization of economic policies and laws; the creation of social development funds and investment banks; and the allocation of special assistance to an association of former colonies and dependencies affiliated with the member states. Those of the ECSC and EURATOM treaties are similar but limited to their respective industries.

Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) are original members of the community. Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece became a member on January 1, 1981. Portugal and Spain applied for membership in 1977, but the tortuous negotiations regarding their membership were likely to delay their formal entry until at least 1986.

The leading institutions of the EC are the Council of Minis-

ters of the European Communities and the Commission of the European Communities, which are both headquartered in Brussels. The council tends to represent the interests of the individual member states; the commission represents those of the EC as a body. In theory, the fields of competence for each organization are separate; in practice, they overlap and blur. Generally, the council makes all the major decisions, acting on advice from the commission, which proposes and implements policy.

The council makes decisions by qualified majority or unanimous vote. For a qualified majority the votes are weighted roughly by population: Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany receive 10 votes each; Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands, five each; Denmark and Ireland, three each; and Luxembourg, two. Unless the council acts on a proposal from the commission, it must have the approval of no fewer than six members for a qualified majority. An agreement reached in 1966 known as the Luxembourg Compromise, however, requires unanimity when any one country declares a decision to be of vital importance. Although the agreement is not part of an EC treaty document, it has been breached only rarely, as, for example, in May 1982, when Britain tried to veto a vote on agricultural policy to gain leverage in other budgetary negotiations. Unanimity is preferred for all major decisions. Several initiatives have been taken to make qualified majority voting the norm for all council actions. Each member appoints a permanent representative to the council to act as ambassador. The actual representative at meetings, varies, however, but is usually a cabinet minister familiar with the issues under discussion. The presidency of the council rotates every six months. The council is assisted by a secretariat, which had some 1,800 staff members in 1983.

The commission has two representatives each from Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany and one representative from each of the other member states. They are appointed for four-year terms. In 1983 some 12,500 staff members, organized into 20 specialized directorates-general, aided the commission in performing its duties.

Since 1974 it has become customary for the heads of state or government of the members of the EC to meet three times a year in a summit conference called the European Council. Although there is no mention of this organization in any EC treaty document, some legal experts believe it to be the supreme manifestation of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities. The European Council has become an important forum for developing common approaches to foreign policy as well as

economic issues. West Germany and Italy have proposed that its role be formalized.

The European Parliament, located in Strasbourg, France, has only advisory powers over the council and the commission, although it may remove the officers of the commission by a three-fourths vote of censure. It does not legislate but responds to actions or queries from the council and the commission and must approve the budget. If parliament rejects the budget, a complex procedure of month-to-month accounting ensues, which gives parliament some bargaining power. Parliament represents the European citizenry, who directly elect their representatives every five years according to local electoral laws. (There was an election in June 1984.) Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany elect 81 members each; the Netherlands, 25; Belgium and Greece, 24 each; Denmark, 16; Ireland, 15; and Luxembourg, 6, for a total of 434 representatives. Parliament had a support staff of 2,950 people in 1983.

The Court of Justice has the final say in interpreting and applying EC "laws," i.e., the policies of the council and the commission, and may judge any document or action except nonbinding opinions of the council. Individuals, corporations, governments, or EC institutions may bring suit to the court. The court may also render preliminary opinions on cases brought to it by other courts within the national judicial systems of the EC members. The court has 11 judges and five advocates-general who serve for renewable six-year terms. All members of the court must be chosen by unanimous decision of the council. In 1983 the court had 480 support staff members.

The Court of Auditors controls and monitors all budgetary revenues and expenditures of the EC. The court consists of 10 members selected by the council for six-year terms. In 1983 the court had a staff of 300 people.

From time to time, proposals from the council or the commission are discussed with the Economic and Social Committee, which is made up of about 150 representatives from employers' groups, trade unions, and other interest groups. Other important EC institutions include the European Investment Bank, agricultural advisory committees set up for individual commodities and markets, the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Fund, and various other funds.

The plethora of organizations dealing with agricultural problems demonstrates the central importance of this sector to the EC. Most of the EC budget is geared toward applying the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which has stirred considerable

debate in the 1980s. The CAP was initially successful in supporting the prices of farm products but by the early 1980s had become a drain on the EC budget. Britain, whose agricultural work force numbers less than one-third of the EC average, has been especially vigorous in demanding a reduction in both its budgetary contribution and CAP subsidies. The CAP has also complicated the negotiations over the entry of Spain and Portugal into the EC. The cheaper commodities (wine and olive oil, for example) produced in those countries would upset the CAP system.

Another set of issues facing the EC concerned institutional reform. In June 1984 an ad hoc committee on institutional affairs was created to consider, among other proposals, the strengthening of the commission's powers, the more frequent use of the qualified majority in the council, and the expansion of parliament's responsibilities. Parliament has drafted the Treaty of European Union, which would broaden cooperation between the EC states and require the council to share its legislative powers with parliament. In late 1984 it was trying to raise support for the treaty in the national parliaments of the member states. It was doubtful whether these efforts could persuade the council to relinquish any of its powers.

Appendix C

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; also called the Atlantic Alliance) is a defensive alliance formed in 1949 to maintain Western military preparedness and to deter conflict with the Soviet Union and the member states of the Warsaw Pact. NATO is an association of Western nations joined together to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and collective self-defense, as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is an intergovernmental, not a supranational, organization in which member states retain their full sovereignty and independence. The member states of NATO are Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United States.

The political task of NATO is to provide for periodic consultation on common political problems and also to give direction to the military aspects of the alliance. The military task of NATO in peacetime is to establish joint defense plans and necessary infrastructures and to sponsor joint training exercises among its members. In peacetime, national forces receive orders from their own national authorities; in war, all forces committed to NATO would be under the direction of the unified NATO command structure.

The aim of the alliance is to guarantee the security of its members and to foster stable international relations. It seeks to achieve these objectives through a policy based on principles of defense and détente. The alliance maintains a strong defense in order to ensure credible deterrence. At the same time, NATO seeks to establish a constructive East-West relationship through dialogue and mutually advantageous cooperation. This includes efforts to achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions.

Alliance decisions reflect the collective perceptions of the member states and are reached through consultation and consensus. The major forum for consultation within the alliance is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is composed of ministerial representatives of the 16 member nations. The NAC meets twice each year, and the members are represented by their ministers of foreign affairs. The NAC occasionally meets at the head of state level as well (see fig. A, this Appendix).

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is composed of representatives of the member countries that actively participate in NATO's integrated military structure and deals specifically with defense matters. At the ministerial level member nations are



Source: Based on information from NATO Information Service, *NATO Handbook*, Brussels, 1983, 30–56; and NATO Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures*, Brussels, 1981, 89–112.

Figure A. Civil and Military Structure of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1984

represented by their ministers of defense. (France withdrew from military participation in the alliance in 1966; Iceland has no military forces.) The secretary general of NATO presides over meetings of the DPC and the NAC.

Nuclear matters are discussed by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG meets twice each year at the level of ministers of defense and as required at the permanent representative level.

The permanent representatives of member countries (ambassadors) are supported by delegations at NATO headquarters in Everre, a suburb of Brussels. NATO military headquarters are located near Mons in southwest Belgium.

The Military Committee is the highest military authority of the alliance and is composed of the chiefs of staff of all member nations but France and Iceland. The chiefs of staff meet at least twice each year. To allow the Military Committee to function continuously, each member also has a permanent military representative. The Military Committee is responsible for recommendations to the NAC and the DPC on actions necessary for the common defense of the NATO area and for supplying guidance on military matters to the major NATO commanders.

The strategic area covered by the alliance is divided among three commands: Allied Command Europe (ACE), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). The heads of these commands are, respectively, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), and Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN). ACE covers the area extending from the North Cape to the Mediterranean Sea and from the Atlantic Ocean to the eastern border of Turkey, excluding Britain and Portugal; the defense of this area falls under several NATO commands. ACLANT covers approximately 31 million square kilometers of the Atlantic Ocean. This area extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the waters of North America to the coasts of Europe and Africa, except for the English Channel and Britain. ACLANT's primary wartime responsibility is to provide security for the Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy in order to safeguard the reinforcement and resupply of NATO Europe with matériel and personnel. ACCHAN covers the English Channel and the southern areas of the North Sea. Its mission is to control and protect merchant shipping in the area and to cooperate with ACE in the air defense of the channel. The forces assigned to ACCHAN are primarily naval but also include maritime air forces. ACCHAN in-

cludes the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), which is a permanent force composed of mine countermeasure vessels of NATO countries.

NATO military forces consist of three interlocking elements, known as the NATO Triad. The conventional forces are able to resist a conventional attack and sustain a conventional defense in forward battle areas until reinforced (see table A, this Appendix). The intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces enhance the conventional deterrent and, if necessary, the defensive effort of the conventional forces against a conventional attack. The nuclear forces would also deter and defend against an attack by nuclear forces of the same kind and provide a linkage to strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Britain, which constitute the third element of the NATO Triad.

NATO has adopted a defensive strategy of "flexible response." This means that NATO maintains sufficient forces to respond to any level of aggression and possesses the full spectrum of forces to counter any act of aggression with an equal or higher level of response. The maintenance of credible deterrence is increasingly difficult because of continued improvement and modernization of the Warsaw Pact forces and because of a common perception that NATO forces have become inferior to the Warsaw Pact. NATO defense policy is also based on eventual disarmament and arms control. In negotiations conducted in Geneva and Vienna, both sides have been discussing reductions not only in nuclear weapons and delivery systems but also in levels of conventional forces. The objective of these talks is an eventual balance of forces at much lower levels.

NATO has survived since 1949, despite policy differences between its members, because the members have been bound by common values and a common desire to unite in defense against a possible military attack by Warsaw Pact forces. Recognizing the political and economic constraints facing West European governments, they have nevertheless made progress in areas considered to be contentious in the early 1980s: sharing the NATO burden (maintaining equivalent levels of financial support), coordinating sanctions against the Soviet Union, and making common policies on problems outside the NATO area.

At least four previous controversies have presented greater cause for alarm than the issues facing the alliance in the 1980s: arguments over the European Defense Community (1950–54), American anger over the Suez invasion of 1956, French withdrawal from NATO military activities in 1966, and European concern about American involvement in Vietnam from 1965 to 1975.

Table A. Conventional Forces in Europe, 1983–84[1]

	NATO		Warsaw Pact	
	Note[2]	Note[3]	Note[4]	Note[5]
Manpower				
Total (in millions)	2.6	4.5	4.0	6.0
Division equivalents[6]	88	115	115	192
Land forces				
Main battle tanks	13,470	17,730	26,900	46,230
Antitank guided weapon launchers	12,340	19,170	18,400	35,400
Artillery/mortars, including rocket launchers	11,000	14,700	18,910	38,800
Armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles	33,000	39,580	53,000	94,800
Attack helicopters	560	900	1,135	1,175
Transport/support helicopters	1,960	6,000	1,180	1,375
Naval forces				
Aircraft carriers	10		2	
Helicopter carriers	n.a.		2	
Cruisers	14		23	
Destroyers and frigates	277		187	
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats	192		515	
Amphibious ships	113		193	
Mine warfare ships	273		378	
Submarines				
Ballistic missile submarines	35		49	
Long-range attack submarines	67		142	
Other	95		55	
Total submarines	197[7]		246[8]	
Sea-based tactical antisubmarine warfare support aircraft	685		181	
Land-based tactical and support aircraft including helicopters	366[9]		700[10]	
Land-based antisubmarine warfare fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters	454		228	
Air forces[11]				
Bombers	0		400[12]	
Fighter-bombers/ground attack	1,960		2,250	
Interceptors/air-combat	795		4,195[13]	
Reconnaissance aircraft	235		585	

Air defense

As of 1983 the Warsaw Pact had nearly 4,000 more antiaircraft guns (20mm and above) than NATO and more than three times as many mobile surface-to-air missile systems than NATO.

Table A. (Continued).

n.a.--not available.

[1]The focus of this comparison is for the most part on those Europe-based forces that can be expected to be available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and those of the Warsaw Pact.

[2]This column applies only to rapidly deployable forces, including those United States forces whose equipment is stored in Western Europe, but it excludes France and Spain, both of which are NATO members but do not participate in the alliance's integrated military structure.

[3]Figures in this column pertain to fully reinforced forces, including North American reinforcements.

[4]Excludes high-readiness Soviet forces stationed in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev, and North Caucasus military districts.

[5]Includes all Warsaw Pact forces located west of the Ural Mountains.

[6]Warsaw Pact divisions are smaller than many NATO divisions but include more tanks and artillery and thus obtain combat power approximately equal to that of NATO divisions.

[7]Fifty percent are nuclear powered.

[8]Sixty-four percent are nuclear powered.

[9]Includes United States Marine Corps aircraft and helicopters.

[10]About 300 of these are bombers.

[11]The figures under this heading refer to combat aircraft in operational units only.

[12]Includes 65 Backfire bombers but excludes Bison and Bear strategic bombers or support aircraft such as tankers or those used for command and control or electronic warfare.

[13]Excludes those in the Moscow military and air defense districts.

Source: Based on information from NATO Information Service, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons*, Brussels, 1984, 8–16; United States, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Atlas of NATO*, Washington, February 1985, 8; and John M. Collins and Patrick M. Cronin, *U.S./Soviet Military Balance: Statistical Trends, 1975–1984 (As of January 1, 1985)*, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 85–83F, April 15, 1985, 97–108.

In addition, the alliance has been torn by debates over the Multilateral Force and Greek-Turkish conflicts over Cyprus.

Difficulties in the mid-1980s reflected the different attitudes the allies had toward Soviet behavior, problems outside the area, international economic difficulties, and defense doctrine and responsibilities. NATO has faced internal tensions created by the antinuclear movement, continued Greek-Turkish disputes, and a perceived growth in Eurocommunism. Many of these controversies have been magnified because of Western Europe's growing self-confidence and willingness to express openly doubts about American policies.

NATO's formal mandate does not encompass the defense of its members' vital interests if they lie outside the treaty area. Historically, the United States has resisted bringing the colonial and post-colonial commitments of Western Europe under the NATO umbrella. This long-held view has been modified as a result of the extraordinary impact of increased Western dependency on Persian Gulf oil, the revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite their economic dependency, West Europeans have been less emotionally affected by these events than the United States and have resisted extending the NATO security area to include the Persian Gulf. Most policymakers agreed in the mid-1980s that a formal extension of NATO's area of coverage is unrealistic.

The economic problems confronting NATO members also exacerbate problems within the alliance. Divergent macroeconomic policies are a primary source of tension between the allies. High United States interest rates have been blamed by West Europeans for attracting short-term capital to the United States, driving up the dollar's exchange rate relative to the West European currencies and pulling up interest rates in Western Europe. West European governments, especially that of West Germany, have pointed out that the more expensive United States dollar increases the cost of buying United States military equipment as well as importing oil. Higher interest rates also increase government budget deficits in Western Europe and make it harder for those states to meet defense-spending commitments.

Bibliography

Chapter 1

Bartier, John, et al. *Histoire de la Belgique contemporaine, 1940–1970.* Brussels: Renaissance du Livre, 1975.

Beaufays, Jean, Michel Hermans, and Pierre Verjans. "Un état unitaire à la derive: La Belgique," *Études et recherches* [Liège], 1983, 35.

Belgium. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development. *Documents Illustrating the History of Belgium*, 2. (Memo from Belgium, Views and Surveys series, No. 180) Brussels: 1978.

Billington, James H. *Fire in the Minds of Men.* New York: Basic Books, 1980.

Coombes, David, and Richard Norton-Taylor. "Renewal in Belgian Politics: The Elections of March 1968," *Parliamentary Affairs* [London], 22, No. 1, Winter 1968–69, 62–72.

Dabin, Paul. "Community Friction in Belgium: 1830–1980." Pages 53–73 in W. Phillips Davison and Leon Gordenaker (eds.), *Resolving Nationality Conflicts: The Role of Public Opinion Research.* New York: Praeger, 1980.

Delfosse, Pascale. "La formation des familles politiques en Belgique (1830–1914)," *Res Publica* [Brussels], 21, No. 3, 1979, 465–95.

De Schryver, Reginald. "The Belgian Revolution and the Emergence of Belgium's Biculturalism." Pages 13–33 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society.* (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

1830...histoire d'une révolte. Brussels: Musin, Editeur, 1980.

Fitzmaurice, John. *The Politics of Belgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Genot, Alain, and David Lowe. "Belgium: A State Divided," *World Today* [London], 36, No. 6, June 1980, 218–24.

Gérard-Libois, Jules, and Xavier Mabille. "Belgian Electoral Politics." Pages 127–38 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society.* (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute

of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Hasquin, Hervé. *Histoire et historiens depuis 1830 en Belgique*, 1 and 2. Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1981.

Heisler, Martin O. "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output Side in Belgium." Pages 178–220 in Martin O. Heisler (ed.), *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies*. New York: McKay, 1974.

Hill, Keith. "Belgium: Political Change in a Segmented Society." Pages 29–107 in Richard Rose (ed.), *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: Free Press, 1974.

L'histoire du mouvement wallon: Journée d'étude de Charleroi, 26 fév. 1976. Charleroi: Institut Jules Destrée, 1978.

Huyse, Lucien. *Passiviteit pacificatie en verzuiling in de belgische politiek: Een sociologische studie* (Passivity, Pacification, and Pillarization in Belgian Politics: A Sociological Study). Antwerp: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1970.

———. "Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium." Pages 107–26 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*. (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Irving, Ronald Eckford Mill. *The Flemings and Walloons of Belgium*. (Report No. 46.) London: Minority Rights Group, 1980.

Kaplan, Irving, et al. *Zaïre: A Country Study*. (DA Pam 550–67.) Washington: GPO for Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1979.

Keefe, Eugene K., et al. *Belgium: A Country Study*. (DA Pam 550–170.) Washington: GPO for Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1979.

Kossmann, E.H. *The Low Countries: 1780–1940*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Langer, William L. (ed.). *An Encyclopedia of World History*. (4th ed.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

Laurent, Pierre-Henri. "The Benelux States and the New Community," *Current History*, 64, No. 380, April 1973, 166–71.

———. "Divided Belgium Walks a Tightrope," *Current History*, 83, No. 492, April 1984, 169–72.

Lijphart, Arend (ed.). *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*. (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Lorwin, Val R. "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics." Pages 147–87 in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

———. "Segmented Pluralism," *Comparative Politics*, 3, No. 2, January 1971, 141–75.

Luykx, Théo. *La Belgique: Histoire et culture.* Brussels: Éditions Meddens, 1972.

———. *Politieke geschiedenis van België* (Political History of Belgium). Brussels: Elsevier, 1968.

———. *Politieke geschiedenis van België van 1789 tot heden* (Political History of Belgium from 1989 to Today). (3d ed.) Brussels: Elsevier, 1973.

MacMullen, Andrew. "The Belgian Election of December 1978: The Limits of Language—Community Politics?" *Parliamentary Affairs* [London], 32, No. 3, Summer 1979, 331–38.

Mallinson, Vernon. *Belgium.* New York: Praeger, 1970.

Meynaud, Jean, Jean Ladrière, and François Perlin (eds.). *La décision politique en Belgique*, (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 138.) Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1965.

Molitor, André. "The Reform of the Belgian Constitution." Pages 139–53 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society.* (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Mughan, Anthony. "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict in Belgium," *Political Studies*, 27, No. 1, March 1979, 21–37.

Obler, Jeffrey, Jürg Steiner, and Guido Dierickx (eds.). *Decision-Making in Smaller Democracies: The Consociational "Burden."* (Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 6, No. 01–064.) Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977.

Omond, G.W.T. *Belgium and Luxembourg.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1923.

Passelecq, Fernand. *La question flamande et l'Allemagne.* Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1917.

Philippart, André. "Belgium: Language and Class Oppositions," *Government and Opposition* [London], 2, No. 1, Winter 1966, 63–81.

Pirenne, Henri. *Histoire de Belgique*, 7. Brussels: Lamertin, 1932.

———. *Histoire de Belgique des origines à nos jours*, 3. Brussels: Renaissance du Livre, 1950.

Polasky, Janet. "Liberalism and Biculturalism." Pages 34–45 in

Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society.* (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Ruys, Manu. *The Flemings: A People on the Move, a Nation in Being.* Tielt, Belgium: Lannoo, 1973.

Simpson, Smith (ed.). "Belgium in Transition," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, No. 247, September 1946, 1–221.

Stengers, Jean. "Belgian National Sentiments." Pages 46–60 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society.* (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

———. "Belgium." Pages 128–67 in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), *The European Right.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.

Urwin, Derekw. "Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of Institutionalization," *Political Studies* [Guildford, Survey, England], 18, No. 3, September 1970, 320–40.

Vander Linden, H. *Belgium: The Making of a Nation.* (Trans., Sybil Jane.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920.

Verdoodt, Albert. *Bibliographie sur le problème linguistique belge.* Quebec: International Center for Research on Bilingualism, 1983.

Verkade, Willem. *Democratic Parties in the Low Countries and Germany: Origins and Historical Developments.* Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1965.

Weil, Gordon L. *The Benelux Nations: The Politics of Small-Country Democracies.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.

Witte, Els, and Jan Craeybeckx. *Politieke geschiedenis van België sinds 1830* (Political History of Belgium since 1830). Antwerp: Scriptoria n.v. Antwerpen, 1981.

Zolberg, Aristide R. "Belgium." Pages 99–138 in Raymond Grew (ed.), *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

———. "The Making of Flemings and Walloons: Belgium, 1830–1914," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 5, No. 2, Autumn 1974, 179–236.

(Various issues of the following publication were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* [London], 1968–80.)

Chapter 2

Abel-Smith, Brian. *Organization, Financing, and Cost of Health Care in the European Community.* (Social Policy series, No. 36.) Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1978.

Barrett, David B. (ed.). *World Christian Encyclopedia.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Bartier, John. "La Franc-Maçonnerie et les associations laïques en Belgique." Pages 177–200 in Hervé Hasquin (ed.), *Histoire de la laïcité.* Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1981.

Bastenier, Albert, and Felice Dassetto (eds.). "La population immigrée en Belgique et le système de sécurité sociale," *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* [Brussels], 901, December 5, 1980, 1–24.

Beardsmore, H. Baetens. "Bilingualism in Belgium," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* [Clevedon, Avon, England], 1, No. 2, 1980, 145–54.

Belgium. Foreign Trade Office. "Hospital Care and Hospitalization: Belgian Achievements, Equipment, and Know-how," *Belgium Economic and Commercial Information* [Brussels], 20, No. 1, 1984, i–xxxii.

Belgium. Ministère des Affaires Économiques. Institut National de Statistique. *Annuaire de statistique.* Brussels: 1965.

———. *Annuaire de statistiques regionales.* Brussels: 1982.

———. *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique*, 102. Brussels: 1982.

———. *Annuaire statistique de poche.* Brussels: 1976.

———. *Annuaire statistique de poche.* Brussels: 1983.

Belgium. Ministries of Education. *Education in Belgium, 1978–80.* Brussels: 1981.

Belgium. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development. *Documents Illustrating the History of Belgium*, 2. (Memo from Belgium, Views and Surveys series, No. 180.) Brussels: 1978.

Billiet, J. "On Belgian Pillarization: Changing Perspectives," *Acta Politica* [Amsterdam], 19, January 1984, 117–28.

Bouillin-Dartevelle, Roselyne. "Bonheur et mal de vivre." Pages 131–52 in Rudolf Rezsohazy and Jan Kerkhofs (eds.), *L'univers des belges.* Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO with Fondation

Roi Baudoin, 1984.

Broerman, Moussy. "Évolution de la population active féminine en Belgique: Tendances de 1970 à 1977—deuxième partie," *Population et famille* [Brussels], Nos. 50–51, 1980, 83–105.

———. "Évolution de la population active féminine en Belgique: Tendances de 1970 à 1977—première partie," *Population et famille* [Brussels], No. 49, 1981, 71–96.

———: "Évolution de la population active féminine en Belgique: Tendances de 1970 à 1977—troisième partie," *Population et famille* [Brussels], No. 52, 1981, 85–113.

Brutsaert, H., and G. Cooreman (eds.). "Empirical Evaluation of Educational Innovations in Belgian High Schools," *Urban Education*, 14, No. 3, October 1979, 359–66.

Bustamante, Hugo, Maurits Van Overbeke, and Albert Verdoodt. "Bilingual Education in Belgium." Pages 3–21 in Bernard Spolsky and Robert L. Cooper (eds.), *Case Studies in Bilingual Education*. Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House, 1978.

Calland, David. *Employment Benefits in Europe*. Epping, Essex, England: Gower Economic, 1975.

Castles, Stephen, Heather Booth, and Tina Wallace. *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*. London: Pluto Press, 1984.

Commission of the European Communities. *Comparative Tables of the Social Security Schemes in Member States of the European Communities*. (12th ed.) n. p: July 1982.

Dabin, Paul. "Community Friction in Belgium: 1830–1980." Pages 53–73 in W. Phillips Davison and Leon Gordenaker (eds.), *Resolving Nationality Conflicts: The Role of Public Opinion Research*. New York: Praeger, 1980.

De Bie, Pierre. "Aspects socio-culturels des classes sociales ascendantes en Belgique," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* [Paris], 39, July-December 1965, 91–111.

Deloof, Eric. *Education in Belgium*. Brussels: Information and Documentation Institute, n. d.

Delooz, Pierre. "Les valeurs dans la famille." Pages 117–30 in Rudolf Rezsohazy and Jan Kerkhofs (eds.), *L'univers des belges*. Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO with Fondation Roi Baudoin, 1984.

Delruelle, Nicole. *La mobilité sociale en Belgique*. Brussels: Éditions de l'Institut de Sociologie, 1970.

Delruelle, Nicole, René Evalenko, and William Fraeys. *Le comportement, politique des électeurs belges*. Brussels: L'Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1970.

Deprez, Kas. "Belgian Netherlandic and Canadian French: A Sociolinguistic Comparison," *Language Problems and Language Planning*, 6, No. 3, Fall 1982, 241–70.

Deprez, Paul."The Low Countries." Pages 236–81 in W.R. Lee (ed.), *European Demography and Economic Growth*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

De Schryver, Reginald. "The Belgian Revolution and the Emergence of Belgium's Biculturalism." Pages 13–33 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*. (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Diem, Aubrey. *Western Europe: A Geographical Analysis*. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1979.

Dierickx, G. "The Management of Subcultural Conflict: The Issue of Education in Belgium (1950–1975)," *Acta Politica* [Amsterdam], 19, January 1984, 85–95.

Dobbelaere, Karel. "La religion en Belgique." Pages 69–116 in Rudolf Rezsohazy and Jan Kerkhofs (eds.), *L'univers des belges*. Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO with Fondation Roi Baudoin, 1984.

Dobbelaere, Karel, and J. Billiet (eds.). "Les changements internes au pilier catholique en Flandre: d'un catholicisme d'église à une chrétienté socioculturelle," *Recherches sociologiques* [Louvain-la-Neuve], 2, 1983, 141–84.

Dorselaer, J. "The Belgian Blue-Collar Worker," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* [Leiden], 10, Nos. 1–2, March-June 1969, 71–79.

Dumon, Wilfried. *Het profiel van de vreemdelingen België* (A profile of Foreigners in Belgium). Leuven: Davidsfonds, 1982.

Dumon, Wilfried A., and G.A. Kooy (eds.). *Echtscheiding in België en Nederland* (Divorce in Belgium and the Netherlands). Deventer: Van Leghum Slaterus, 1983.

Economist Intelligence Unit. *Quarterly Economic Review Belgium/Luxembourg* [London], No. 2, 1984 (entire issue).

"Enseignement supplement à nos éditions datées du mercredi 6 juin 1984," *Le Soir* [Brussels], June 6, 1984.

Eurostat. *Eurostat Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparisons with Some European Countries, Canada, the USA, Japan, and the USSR*. (20th ed.) Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1983.

Fletcher, Ann. *Education in Belgium: A Study of the Educational System of Belgium and a Guide to the Academic Placement of*

Students in Educational Institutions of the United States. (Word Education series.) Washington: American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (forthcoming).

Fox, Renée C. "Is Religion Important in Belgium?" *European Journal aof Sociology/Archives européennes de sociologie* [Cambridge], 23, No. 1, 1982, 3–38.

———. "Medical Scientists in a Château," *Science*, 136, No. 3515, May 11, 1962, 476–83.

———. "Why Belgium?" *European Journal of Sociology/Archives européennes de sociologie [Cambridge], 19, 1978, 205–28.*

Fulcher, Derick. *Medical Care Systems.* Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1974.

Geiger, Roger L. "The Changing Demand for Higher Education in the Seventies: Adaptations Within Three National Systems," *Higher Education* [Amsterdam], 9, May 1980, 255–76.

German, Jean, and Jean Marie Pierret (eds.). "Dialectologie en Wallonie," *Cahiers, Institut de Linguistique de Louvain* [Louvain], 7, 1981 (entire issue).

Gol, Jean. "The Middle Classes since 1830." Pages 52–53 in Albert d'Haenens (ed.), *150 Years of Communities and Culture in Belgium, 1830–1980.* Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980.

Great Britain. Admiralty. Naval Intelligence Division. *Belgium.* London: February 1944.

Heisler, Martin O. "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, No. 433, September 1977, 32–46.

Henryon, Claude, and E. Lambrechts (eds.). *Le mariage en Belgique.* Brussels: Institut de Recherches Economiques, Sociales, et Politiques, Centre de Recherches Sociologiques, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1968.

Hill, Keith. "Belgium: Political Change in a Segmented Society." Pages 29–107 in Richard Rose (ed.), *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: Free Press, 1974.

Hill, L. Brooks. "Belgium: A Historical Analysis of a Linguistically Divided Nation," *Sociologia Internationalis* [Berlin], 11, Nos. 1–2, 1973, 153–68.

Holmes, Brian (ed.). *International Handbook of Education Systems*, 1. Chichester, England: Wiley and Sons, 1983.

Huyse, Lucien. "Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium." Pages 107–26 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society.* (Re-

search Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Irving, Ronald Eckford Mill. *The Flemings and Walloons of Belgium.* (Report No. 46.) London: Minority Rights Group, 1980.

Kane, Jean Ellen. "Flemish and Walloon Nationalism: Devolution of a Previously Unitary State." Pages 122–71 in Uri Ra'anan (ed.), *Ethnic Resurgence in Modern Democratic States: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Human Resources and Conflict.* New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.

Keefe, Eugene K., et al. *Belgium: A Country Study.* (DA Pàm 550–170.) Washington: GPO for Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1979.

Knowles, Asa S. (ed.). *International Encyclopedia of Higher Education*, 3. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977.

Lauwers, Jan. "Les belges et le travail." Pages 189–217 in Rudolf Rezsohazy and Jan Kerkhofs (eds.). *L'univers des belges.* Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO with Fondation Roi Baudouin, 1984.

Lefevere, Patricia. "Belgium: A Country in the Doldrums," *New Catholic World*, 226, No. 1355, September-October 1983, 208–10.

Lefèvre, Jacques. "Dialect and Regional Identification in Belgium: The Case of Wallonia," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* [Amsterdam], No. 15, 1978, 47–51.

Lessard, Jr., William J. "Social Security and Economic Reforms in Belgium," *Benefits International*, [London], 11, No. 9, March 1982, 26–31.

Lesthaeghe, Ron J. *The Decline of Belgian Fertility, 1800–1970.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Levy, M.G. "Linguistic and Semantic Borders in Belgium," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* [Amsterdam], No. 15, 1978, 9–19.

Lorwin, Val R. "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics." Pages 147–87 in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

———. "Linguistic Pluralism and Political Tension in Modern Belgium." Pages 386–412 in Joshua A. Fishman (ed.), *Advances in the Sociology of Language*, 2. The Hague: Mouton, 1972.

Louckx, Freddy. "Linguistic Ambivalence of the Brussels Indigenous Population," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* [Amsterdam], No. 15, 1978, 53–60.

Mallinson, Vernon. *Power and Politics in Belgian Education.*

London: Heinemann, 1963.

———. *The Western European Idea in Education*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980.

Meeus, Baudewijn. "A Diglossic Situation: Standard vs. Dialect." Pages 335–64 in William Francis Macky and Jacob Ornstein (eds.), *Sociolinguistic Studies in Language Contact: Methods and Cases*. The Hague: Mouton, 1979.

Monkhouse, Francis John. *A Regional Geography of Western Europe*. (3d ed.) New York: Praeger, 1967.

Nuttin, Jozef. *Het stereotiep beeld van Walen, Vlamingen en Brusselaars: Hun kijk op zichzelf en op elkaar—een empirisch onderzoek bij universitairen*. (The Stereotypes of Walloons, Flemings, and Bruxellois: Their Views of Themselves and of Others—an Empirical Study of Universities). Brussels: Paleis der Academien, 1976.

Obler, Jeffrey. "Assimilation and the Moderation of Linguistic Conflict in Brussels." Pages 35–76 in Susan E. Clarke and Jeffrey L. Obler (eds.) *Urban Ethnic Conflict*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1976.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower, and Education. *SOPEMI*. Paris: 1982.

Pijnenburg, B. "Pillarized and Consociational-Democratic Belgium: The Views of Huyse," *Acta Politica* [Amsterdam], 19, January 1984, 57–71.

Poulain, Michel, and Brigitte Van Goethem. "Evolution de la mobilité interne de la population belge de 1948 à 1979," *Population* [Paris], 37, March-April 1982, 319–40.

Rezsohazy, Rudolf. "Introduction historique à l'étude des valeurs." Pages 9–37 in Rudolf Rezsohazy and Jan Kerkhofs (eds.), *L'univers des belges*. Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO with Fondation Roi Badoin, 1984.

Riley, Raymond Charles, and G.J. Ashworth (eds.). *Benelux*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975.

Robinson, Harry. *Western Europe*, 3. (Advanced Level Geography series, No. 5.) London: University Tutorial Press, 1972.

Roosens, Eugeen. "The Multicultural Nature of Contemporary Belgian Society: The Immigrant Community." Pages 61–92 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*. (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Schoen, Robert, John Baj, and Karen Woodrow. "Marriage and

Divorce in Twentieth-Century Belgian Cohorts," *Journal of Family History*, 9, No. 1, Spring 1984, 88–97.

Schoonbroodt, Jos. "Austerité et inégalités de revenus en Belgique," *La revue nouvelle* [Brussels], 73, No. 2, February 1981, 133–45.

Stephenson, Glenn V. "Cultural Regionalism and the Unitary State Idea in Belgium," *Geographical Review*, 62, No. 4, October 1972, 501–23.

Swing, Elizabeth Sherman. *Bilingualism and Linguistic Segregation in the Schools of Brussels*. Quebec: International Center for Research on Bilingualism, 1980.

———. "The Politicolinguistics of Education in Belgium," *Word*, 32, No. 3, December 1981.

——— "Separate but Equal: An Inquiry into the Impact of the Language Controversy on Education in Belgium," *Western European Education*, 5, No. 4, Winter 1973, 6–33.

Turney-High, Harry Holbert. *Chateau-Gerard: The Life and Times of a Walloon Village*. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1953.

Urwin, Derekw. "Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of Institutionalization," *Political Studies* [Guildford, Surrey, England], 18, No. 3, September 1970, 320–40.

Van den Broeck, Jef. "Class Differences in Syntactic Complexity in the Flemish Town of Maaseik," *Language in Society* [Cambridge], 6, No. 2, August 1977, 149–81.

Vandeputte, Omer. *Dutch: The Language of Twenty Million Dutch and Flemish People*. n. pl.: Flemish-Netherlands Foundation "Stichting Ons Erdeel vzw," 1981.

van Haegendoren, Maurits. "Belgium and Its Double Language Boundary," *La monda lingvo-problemo* [Rotterdam], 2, No. 4, January 1970, 17–20.

Van Hout, Georges. "Secularism." Pages 78–81 in Albert d'Haenens (ed.), *150 Years of Communities and Culture in Belgium, 1830–1980*. Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980.

Verdoodt, Albert. *Bibliographie sur le problème linguistique belge*. Quebec: International Center for Research on Bilingualism, 1983.

———. "Introduction," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* [Amsterdam], No. 15, 1978, 5–9.

Vilemsky, Vitězslav. "Belgium of the Eighties: Unitary, Bi-cultural, or Made Up of Three Regions?" *Europa Ethnica* [Vienna], 40, No. 1, 1983, 1–14.

Vollans, E.C. "Urban Development in Belgium since 1830." Pages 171–93 in R.P. Beckinsale and J.M. Houston (eds.), *Urbanization and Its Problems*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968.

Voyé, Liliane. "Aspects de l'évolution récente du 'monde catholique,'" *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* [Brussels], 925–26, June 26, 1981, 1–32.

Willems, Paul, Stanley Wijewickrema, and Ronny Lesthaeghe (eds.), "L'évolution de la fecondité en Belgique, 1950–1980," *Population et famille* [Brussels], No. 52, 1981, 115–51.

Witte, Els. "Déchristianisation et sécularisation en Belgique." Pages 149–75 in Hervé Hasquin (ed.), *Histoire de la laïcité*. Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1981.

World Bank. *World Development Report, 1984*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

World Health Organization. *Health Services in Europe*. (3d ed.) (Country Reviews of Statistics series, No. 2.) Copenhagen: 1981.

Young, Gordon. "Chocolate: Food of the Gods," *National Geographic*, 166, No. 5, November 1984, 664–87.

Zolberg, Aristide R. "Belgium." Pages 99–138 in Raymond Grew (ed.), *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

———. "The Making of Flemings and Walloons: Belgium, 1830–1914," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 5, No. 2, Autumn 1974, 179–235.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Brief uit België—Lettre de Belgique*, January 1983-September 1984; *La libre Belgique* [Brussels], March 1984; and *Le Soir* [Brussels], March-June 1984.)

Chapter 3

Association Belge des Banques. *Rapport annuel, 1983*. Brussels: 1983.

Banque Nationale de Belgique. *Bulletin de la Banque Nationale de Belgique* [Brussels], 1, No. 2, February 1984.

Belgium. Foreign Trade Office. "Belgium, a Go-Ahead Partner for Agro-Industrial Development," *Belgium Economic and Commercial Information* [Brussels], 18, No. 70, Fourth Quarter 1982, 1–30.

———. "A Leader in Innovation and Research: The Belgian Non-Ferrous Metals Industry," *Belgium Economic and Com-*

mercial Information [Brussels], 19, No. 72, Second Quarter 1983, 1–28.

——— "New Forms of Energy and Energy Saving," *Belgium Economic and Commercial Information* [Brussels], 19, No. 73, Third Quarter 1983, 1–28.

Belgium. Information and Documentation Institute. *Atlas of Belgium.* Brussels: 1978.

———. "Belgium's Economy: Survey and Trends," *More About Belgium* [Brussels], No. 11, February 1981 (entire issue).

Belgium. Ministère de l'Agriculture. Institut Économique Agricole. *Evolution de l'économie agricole et horticole (1982–1983).* (Cahiers de l' I.E.A., No. 239/RP–27.) Brussels: December 1983.

Belgium. Ministère des Affaires Économiques. Administration de l' Industrie Expansion Économique et Investissements Étrangers. *Investissements étrangers en Belgique,* 1. Brussels: 1982.

Belgium. Ministère des Affaires Économiques. Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation. *Aperçu économique trimestriel* [Brussels], No. 2, June 1984 (entire issue).

———. *L'économie belge en 1979,* 1. Brussels: 1980.

———. *L'économie belge en 1982,* 1. Brussels: 1983.

———. *L'économie belge en 1983,* 1. Brussels: 1984.

———. *Entreprises industrielles et commerciales en Belgique.* Brussels: December 1980.

Belgium. Ministère des Affaires Économiques. Institut National de Statistique. *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique,* 102. Brussels: 1982.

———. *Bulletin de statistique* [Brussels], 69, Nos. 9–10, September-October 1983 (entire issue).

Belgium. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, du Commerce Extérieur, et de la Cooperation au Développement. *La Belgique et la Communauté Européenne.* (Textes et documents, collection "idées et études," No. 317.) Brussels: 1979.

Belgium. Ministry of Economic Affairs. *Belgium Investment Guide.* Brussels: 1982.

———. *New Economic Opportunities in Belgium.* Brussels: September 1984.

Belgium. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development. Information and Documentation Institute. *The Organizational Structure of the Belgian Economy.* (Belgian News series, No. 3.) Brussels: 1976.

"Belgium." Pages 127–56 in Dougas Yuill and Kevin Allen (eds.), *European Regional Incentives, 1983*. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1983.

Blanden, Michael. "Belgian Banks Thrust Abroad," *Banker* [London], 134, No. 697, March 1984, 95–99.

Blanpain, R. "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Belgium," *International Labour Review* [Geneva], 123, No. 3, May-June 1984, 319–32.

Bourke, Gerald. "Exporters Face Bleak Prospects," *Africa Economic Digest* [London], 4, No. 8, December 9–15, 1983, 16–21.

Commission of the European Communities. "Belgium," *European Economy* [Brussels], No. 19, March 1984, 25–30.

Cowie, Donald. *Belgium: The Land and the People*. Cranbury, New Jersey: Barnes, 1977.

Credit Communal de Belgique. Société Nationale de Credit à l'Industrie. *L'industrie en Belgique: Deux siècles d' évolution, 1780–1980*. Brussels: 1981.

Defeyt, Philippe, and Jean Houard. "Restructuration industrielle: La Belgique face à ses concurrents européens (1970–1979)," *Annales de science économiques appliquées* [Louvain], 37, No. 4, 1981, 25–41.

Diem, Aubrey. *Western Europe: A Geographical Analysis*. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1979.

Economist Intelligence Unit. *Quarterly Economic Review; Belgium/Luxembourg* [London], No. 2, 1984 (entire issue).

Evalenko, René. *Régime économique de la Belgique*. Brussels: Vander, 1968.

Fitzmaurice, John. *The Politics of Belgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Geographical Information and Documentation Center. *Flanders: A Geographical Portrait*. Antwerp: January 1984.

International Monetary Fund. *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1983*. Washington: 1984.

———. *Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1983*. Washington: 1983.

Joint Publications Research Service—JPRS (Washington). The following items are from the JPRS series:

West Europe Report.

"Difficulties Seen in Proposed Regionalization of Industry," *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, Zurich, January 22, 1983. (JPRS 82904, No. 2103, February 18, 1983, 15–16.)

"Economic Affairs Minister Tries to Deal with Tex-

tile Industry Problems," *Knack*, Brussels, July 30, 1980. (JPRS 76369, No. 1618, September 5, 1980, 41–46.)

"Energy Use Dropped, Natural Gas Sales Rose in 1983," *De Standard*, Brussels, May 11, 1984. (JPRS WER-84–086, July 16, 1984, 113–14.)

"Flemish Economists View Impact of Regionalization," *Le Soir*, Brussels, June 22, 1982. (JPRS WER-81–637, No. 2021, August 26, 1982, 12–14.)

"Industrial Policy in Wallonia Discussed," *Contrepoint*, Paris, 1983. (JPRS WER-83–525, No. 2145, May 23, 1983, 23–34.)

Kayebergh, Victor. "Roles of Banks Intertwine," *American Banker*, 147, No. 152, August 6, 1982, 9.

Knoops, Etienne. "La recherche scientifique peut-elle assurer l'avenir énergétique de la Belgique?" *Demain* [Liège), 81, No. 292, April-June 1982, 222–32.

Kredietbank. "Ailing Public Finances," *Weekly Bulletin* [Brussels], 38, No. 35, October 7, 1983 (entire issue).

———. "The Belgian Banking Sector in Profile," *Weekly Bulletin* [Brussels], 38, No. 16, April 22, 1983 (entire issue).

———. "The Belgian Economy: Two Years after the Devaluation," *Weekly Bulletin* [Brussels], 39, No. 11, March 16, 1984 (entire issue).

———. "Municipal Finance: In Dire Straits," *Weekly Bulletin* [Brussels], 38, No. 20, May 20, 1983 (entire issue).

———. "Strong and Weak Points of the Belgian Export Structure," *Weekly Bulletin* [Brussels], 39, No. 16, April 20, 1984 (entire issue).

———. "The Tribulations of the Belgian Textile Plan," *Weekly Bulletin* [Brussels], 37, No. 8, February 19, 1982 (entire issue).

———. "Two Years of the Law on Share Investments," *Weekly Bulletin* [Brussels], 39, No. 14, April 6, 1984 (entire issue).

Laurent, Pierre-Henri."Divided Belgium Walks a Tightrope," *Current History*, 83, No. 492, April 1984, 169–72.

Lentzen, Evelyne, and Etienne Arcq. "Les secteurs nationaux," *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* [Brussels], No. 938, October 30, 1981 (entire issue).

Leroy, R., A. Godano, and A. Sonnet. "La configuration spatiale de la crise de l'emploi," *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* [Brussels], No. 1023–24, December 23, 1983 (entire issue).

Markey, M. "Éléments pour la politique énergétique belge au cours des 10 prochaines années." *Revue générale du gaz* [Brussels], 101, No. 3, July-August-September 1979, 91–100.

Moden, J. "L' indexation des salaires (I) (II)," *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* [Brussels], No. 997–98, May 20, 1983 (entire issue).

Mont, J. "De zwarte activiteiten in België: Oorzaken, omvang en implicaties," *Tijdschriftvoor economie en management* [Leuven], 27, No. 3, 1982, 259–73.

"A Most Unnatural Country," *Economist* [London], 274, No. 7116, January 19, 1980, 1–21 (Survey).

Moulaert, Frank. "Economic Crisis and the Employment of Foreign Workers in Belgium," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 16, No. 2, Summer 1981, 47–66.

Mughan, Anthony. "The Belgian Election of 1981: The Primacy of the Economics," *West European Politics* [London], 5, No. 3, October 1982, 298–304.

National Bank of Belgium. *Report for 1983*. Brussels: February 1984.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. *Belgium-Luxembourg*. Paris: March 1981

———. *Belgium-Luxembourg*. Paris: April 1982.

———. *Belgium-Luxembourg*. Paris: May 1983.

———. "Belgium." Pages 43–54 in *The Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries*. Paris: 1982.

Piraux, M. "La rénovation rurale en Wallonie: Développement global, redéploiement wallon," *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* [Brussels], No. 968, June 25, 1982 (entire issue).

Quévit, Michel. *Les causes du déclin wallon*. Brussels: Éditions Vie Ouvrière, 1978.

Riley, Raymond. *Belgium*. Folkestone, Kent, England: Dawson and Sons, 1976.

Riley, Raymond Charles, and G.J. Ashworth (eds.). *Benelux*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975.

Schiltz, Hugo. "L'hypothèse séparatiste vue dans sa perspective économique," *Res Publica* [Brussels], 26, No. 3, 1984, 383–91.

Senelle, Robert. *The Reform of the Belgian State*, 3. (Memo from Belgium, Views and Surveys series, No. 189.) Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development, 1980.

Smits, Jozef. "Belgian Politics in 1983: Communitarian Struggles Despite the Economic Crisis." Pages 473–502 in *Politiek Jaarboek/Année Politique, 1983*. Brussels: Res Publica, 1984.

Société Générale de Belgique. *Annual Report, 1983*. Brussels: 1983.

———. "Changes in the Belgian Economy as Reflected by the

National Accounts," *Monthly Review* [Brussels], 21, No. 219, March 1982 (entire issue).

Thomas, Gérald. "Pouvoirs publics et création d' entreprises," *Reflects et perspectives de la vie économique* [Brussels], 19, No. 5, 1980, 337–43.

"Trade Links Fostered in Climate of Goodwill." *Middle East Economic Digest* [London], 26, No. 47, November 19–25, 1982, 3–7.

United States. Department of Commerce. Office of Country Marketing. *Marketing in Belgium/Luxembourg*, (Overseas Business Reports, OBR 78–46.) Washington: GPO, April 1981.

United States. Embassy in Brussels. *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States.* (International Marketing Information series, No. FET 84–52.) Washington: International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, June 1984.

United States. Embassy in Brussels. Agricultural Attaché. *Agricultural Situation Report—Belgium and Luxembourg: CY 1983.* (BE4004.) Brussels: February 1984.

Urbain, Robert. "Le système belge à l' exportation," *Studia Diplomatica* [Brussels], 34, No. 5, 1981, 569–82.

Van Hecke, E. "The Structure of Belgian Agricultural Production," *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* [Amsterdam], 74, No. 3, 1983, 213–16.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Belgium Economic and Commercial Information* [Brussels], First Quarter 1980-First Quarter 1984; *Brief uit België-Lettre de Belgique* [Brussels], January 1983-October 1984; *Business Memo from Belgium*, January 1982-October 1984; *L'économie belge* [Brussels], 1975–83; *Economist* [London], January 1980-October 1984; *Financial Times* [London], January 1980-October 1984; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe*, April-October 1984; Joint Publications Research Service, *West Europe Report*, January 1982-October 1984; *Kredietbank Weekly Bulletin*[Brussels], January 1980-September 1984; *New York Times*, January 1981-October 1984; *Société Générale de Banque Monthly Review* [Brussels], January 1979-December 1983; and *Wall Street Journal*, January 1981-October 1984.)

"Belgians and Dutch Curtail the Welfare State," *New York Times*, June 3, 1984, A9.

Belgium. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development. *Belgian Foreign Policy Aims and Objectives*. (Memo from Belgium, Views and Surveys series, No. 191.) Brussels: 1982.

Cheeseright, Paul. "Belgium: Martens Government Has Moved to Curb Growth of Public Sector and to Boost Exports," *Europe* [Paris], No. 242, March-April 1984, 30–33.

———. "Belgium's Competing Voices Grow Louder," *Financial Times* [London], July 10, 1984, 2.

———. "Belgium Unveils Three-Year Austerity Plan," *Financial Times* [London], March 16, 1984, 1.

———. "Seven Parties Compete Amid Acute Economic Stress," *Financial Times* [London], May 31, 1984, 2.

———. "U.S. Tries to Defuse Row with Belgium," *Financial Times* [London], August 15, 1984, 2.

Covell, Maureen. "Ethnic Conflict and Elite Bargaining: The Case of Belgium," *West European Politics* [London], 4, No. 3, October 1981, 197–218.

Cowie, Donald. *Belgium: The Land and the People*. Cranbury, New Jersey: Barnes, 1977.

Deweerdt, Mark, and Jozef Smits. "Belgian Politics in 1981: Continuity and Change in the Crisis." Pages 261–72 in *Politiek Jaarboek/Année politique, 1981*. Brussels: Res Publica, 1982.

Dogan, Mattei (ed.). *The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants*. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1975.

Dumoulin Michel. "1945–1980: An Active Part in the New World Order." Pages 239–40 in Albert d'Haenens (ed.)., *150 Years of Communities and Cultures in Belgium, 1830–1980*. Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980.

Fitzmaurice, John. *The Politics of Belgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Genot, Alain, and David Lowe. "Belgium: A State Divided," *World Today* [London], 36, No. 6, June 1980, 218–24.

d'Haenens, Albert (ed.). *150 Years of Communities and Cultures in Belgium, 1830–1980*. Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980.

Heisler, Martin O. "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a

Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output Side in Belgium." Pages 178–220 in Martin O. Heisler (ed.), *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies*. New York: McKay, 1974.

———. "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*. No. 433, September 1977, 32–46.

Heisler, Martin O. (ed.). *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies*. New York: McKay, 1974.

Hill, Keith. "Belgium: Political Change in a Segmented Society." Pages 29–109 in Richard Rose (ed.), *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: Free Press, 1974.

Irving, Richard Eckford Mill. "The Belgian General Election of 1978: Not Quite a Non-Event," *West European Politics* [London], 2, No. 2, May 1979, 250–55.

———. "Christian Democracy in Belgium." Pages 164–91 in Richard Eckford Mill Irving (ed.), *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1979.

———. *The Flemings and Walloons of Belgium*. (Report No. 46.) London: Minority Rights Group, 1980.

Irving, Richard Eckford Mill (ed.) *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1979.

Kane, Jean Ellen. "Flemish and Walloon Nationalism: Devolution of a Previously Unitary State." Pages 122–71 in Uri Ra'anan (ed.), *Ethnic Resurgence in Modern Democratic States: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Human Resources and Conflict*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.

Laurent, Pierre-Henri. "Divided Belgium Walks a Tightrope," *Current History*, 83, No. 492, April 1984, 169–72.

Layton-Henry, Zig (ed.). *Conservative Politics in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, 21, No. 2, January 1969, 207–25.

MacMullen, Andrew. "The Belgian Election of November 1981: Economic Polarisation in a Multi-Party System," *Parliamentary Affairs* [London], 35, No. 2, Spring 1982, 193–200.

Molitor, André. "The Reform of the Belgian Constitution." Pages 139–53 in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*. (Research Series, No. 46.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.

Moulin, Léo. "The Politicization of the Administration in Belgium." Pages 163–85 in Mattei Dogan (ed.), *The Mandarins*

of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1975.

Mughan, Anthony. "The Belgian Election of 1981: The Primacy of the Economics," *West European Politics* [London], 5, No. 3, October 1982, 298–304.

———. "The Failure of Conservative Politics in Belgium." Pages 160–81 in Zig Layton-Henry (ed.), *Conservative Politics in Western Europe.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

———. "Modernization and Regional Relative Deprivation: Towards a Theory of Ethnic Conflict." Pages 279–312 in L.J. Sharpe (ed.), *Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies.* London: Sage, 1979.

Obler, Jeffrey. "Interparty Democracy and the Selection of Parliamentary Candidates: The Belgian Case," *British Journal of Political Science* [London], 4, April 1974, 163–85.

"One Belgium, Two, Three, or None?" *Economist* [London], 275, No. 7128, April 12, 1980, 29.

Osborn, Alan. "Linguistic Divide Key to Belgian Nation," *Europe* [Paris], No. 242, March-April 1984, 34–35.

Palmer, Michael. "The Role of a Directly Elected European Parliament," *World Today* [London], 33, No. 4, April 1977, 122–30.

Parker, Geoffrey. *The Countries of Community Europe.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Politiek Jaarboek/Année politique, 1981. Brussels: Res Publica, 1982.

Politiek Jaarboek/Année politique, 1982. Brussels: Res Publica, 1983.

Politiek Jaarboek/Année politique, 1983. Brussels: Res Publica, 1984.

Senelle, Robert. *The Belgian Constitution; Commentary.* (Memo from Belgium, Views and Surveys series, No. 166.) Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development, 1974.

———. *The Reform of the Belgian State: Regional Structures Set Up in Terms of the Laws Passed on 8 and 9 of August 1980,* 3. (Memo from Belgium, Views and Surveys series, No. 189.) Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade, and Cooperation in Development, 1980.

Smits, Jozef. "Belgian Politics in 1983: Communitarian Struggles Despite the Economic Crisis." Pages 473–502 in *Politiek Jaarboek/Année politique, 1983.* Brussels: Res Publica, 1984.

———. "Belgian Politics in 1982: Less Democracy for a Better Economy." Pages 161–216 in *Politiek Jaarboek/Année*

politique, 1982. Brussels: Res Publica, 1983.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. *Background Notes: Belgium*. (Department of State Publication, No. 8087.) Washington: GPO, June 1983.

Urwin, Derek W. "Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of Institutionalization," *Political Studies* [Guildford, Surrey, England], 18, No. 3, September 1970, 320–40.

Van de Wauwer, Danny. "Les élections communales du 10 octobre 1982." Pages 377–89 in *Politiek Jaarboek/Année politique, 1983*. Brussels: Res Publica, 1983.

Van Hassel, Hugo. "Belgian Civil Servants and Political Decision Making." Pages 187–95 in Mattei Dogan (ed.), *The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants*. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1975.

Verdoodt, Albert. *Linguistic Tensions in Canadian and Belgian Labor Unions*. Quebec: International Center for Research on Bilingualism, 1977.

"Who Can Rule Belgium if It Swings Eight Ways at Once?" *Economist* [London], 281, No. 7211, November 14, 1981, 55–56.

Ysebaert, Clair (comp.). *Memento politique, 1983: Martens V*. Antwerp: Uitgeverij Kluwer, 1983.

Zolberg, Aristide R. "Belgium." Pages 99–138 in Raymond Grew (ed.), *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

———. "Splitting the Difference: Federalisation Without Federalism in Belgium." Pages 103–42 in Milton J. Esman (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Financial Times* [London], January 1980-September 1984; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* [London], January 1974-June 1984; *London Times*, January 1980-June 1984; and *New York Times*, January 1975-October 1984.)

Chapter 5

Cochard, Renata. "Terrorism and Extradition in Belgian Law," *U.S. National Criminal Justice Reference Service: International Summaries*, 3, 1979, 139–46.

Donnet, Michel. "Cross-roads of Europe: Armed Forces of Belgium in NATO," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, No. 24, February-

March 1979, 40–48.

Grimmett, Richard F. "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers, 1976–1983." (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Report 84–82F.) May 7, 1984.

Hewish, Mark, et al. *Air Forces of the World.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981.

Houben, Kris. "Wet en werklijkheid inzake het talevenwicht in het Belgisch officierencorps," *Res Publica* [Brussels], No. 1, 1983, 75–93.

Keegan, John (ed.). *World Armies.* Detroit: Gale, 1983.

Langer, William L. (ed.). *An Encyclopedia of World History.* (4th ed.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

Lunn, Sidney. "NATO after Afghanistan." (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Report 80–151F.) August 22, 1980.

The Military Balance, 1983–1984. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983.

NATO Information Service. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures.* Brussels: 1981.

North Atlantic Assembly. Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe. "Interim Report on Nuclear Weapons in Europe." Pages 244–96 in United States Library of Congress (ed.), *What Should Be the Level of U.S. Commitments for National Defense?* Washington: GPO, 1982.

Olson, Eric T. "NATO Burden-Sharing: A New Look Needed," *Military Review,* No. 63, November 1983, 12–20.

Sampson, Anthony. *The Arms Bazaar.* New York: Viking Press, 1973.

Scheyven, Louis M.E.M. "Compulsory Service System in Belgium," *Forensic Quarterly,* 42, August 1968.

"Service d'information du ministère de la défense nationale," *VOX: hebdomadaire militaire* [Brussels], No. 30, May 24, 1984, 1–16.

Sloan, Stanley R. *Defense Burden-Sharing: U.S. Relations with NATO Allies and Japan.* (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Report 83–140F.) July 8, 1983.

———. *European Security, American Interests, and Alternatives to NATO.* (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Report 78–10F.) January 15, 1978.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The Arms Trade with the Third World.* New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975.

Thayer, George. *The War Business: The International Trade in*

Armaments. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.

Thompson, Wayne C. *Western Europe, 1983*. Washington: Stryker-Post, 1983.

Tuchman, Barbara. *The Proud Tower*. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972–1982*. Washington: 1984.

United States. Congress. 97th, 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization—An Alliance of Shared Values*. (Committee print.) Washington: GPO, 1982.

United States. Congress. 97th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *NATO Today: The Alliance in Evolution*. Washington: GPO, April 1982.

United States. General Accounting Office. "Selection of a Machine Gun for Armored Vehicles." (Report No. PSAD-76–112.) Washington: March 1976.

———. "Sharing the Defense Burden: The Multinational F-16 Aircraft Program." (Report No. PSAD-77–40.) Washington: August 1977.

Weinberger, Caspar W. *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the United States Congress*. Washington: Department of Defense, 1984.

Williams, Phil, and William Wallace (eds.). "Emerging Technologies and European Security," *Survival* [London], 26, No. 2, March-April 1984, 70–78.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Air Force*, January 1982-October 1984; *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1980-October 1984; *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, January-October 1984; *Economist* [London], January 1980-October 1984; *International Defense Review* [Geneva], January 1980-October 1984; *Jane's Defence Weekly* [London], June-October 1984; *New York Times*, January 1980- October 1984; and *Washington Post*, January 1980-October 1984.)

Glossary

arrondissement—An administrative division subordinate to a province.

Belgian franc (BF)—The national currency, consisting of 100 centimes. Since 1980 the Belgian franc has generally fluctuated downward and was devalued 8.5 percent in 1982. The number of Belgian francs per US$1 averaged 29.24 in 1980, 37.13 in 1981, 45.69 in 1982, and 51.13 in 1983.

black work—Remunerated work not reported to the authorities to avoid income taxes and social security contributions.

concertation—Institutionalized consultation among public authorities, employer associations, workers' representatives, and professional organizations to harmonize conflicting views on national economic planning and socioeconomic policy, including the terms and conditions of employment. The Belgian industrial relations system has a dual structure with institutions at both the national and the industry levels responsible solely for either economic affairs or social issues.

corporatist society—A society organized into a limited number of hierarchical industrial and professional associations (corporations) that are recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state to serve as the organs of political representation and to control persons and activities within their jurisdiction. Corporatism was a particularly strong current in Roman Catholic social thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Estates—Provincial assemblies, dating from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, composed of representatives from the clergy, nobility, and important economic groups (guild masters in urban areas, landowners in rural areas). Sometimes used to refer to the component groups within the assemblies.

feudalism—The hierarchical system of political organization prevailing in Europe from the ninth to about the fifteenth century that was based on reciprocal relations between lord, providing protection and land, and vassal, providing services. The economy associated with feudalism was a premarket and nonmonetary subsistence agriculture based on the manorial system of large landholdings owned by the lord and worked by serfs or tenant farmers.

fiscal year (FY)—Belgium's fiscal year is the same as the calendar year.

flat-rate indexation system—Temporarily instituted in Belgium in 1982 and 1983 to replace proportional indexation system (*q.v.*). The purpose of this arrangement was to limit indexation to the national minimum wage by only increasing wages by a fixed amount each time inflation crossed a specified threshold.

GDP—Gross domestic product. The total value of all final (consumption and investment) goods and services produced by an economy in a given period, usually a year.

GNP—Gross national product. The GDP (*q.v.*) plus income from overseas investments minus earnings of foreign investors in the home economy.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

mixed economy—An economy that contains both private and public enterprises.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)—Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the OECD is an international organization composed of the industrialized market economy countries (24 full members as of 1984). It seeks to promote economic and social welfare in member countries as well as in developing countries by providing a forum in which to formulate and coordinate policies designed to achieve this end.

offset agreement—A trade arrangement, mainly used for defense-related sales, in which the supplier assists in or arranges for the marketing of goods or services from the buying country. Sometimes a portion of the supplier's exported product is manufactured by companies in the buying country.

oil equivalent tons—A measure that signifies the number of tons of oil required to produce an equivalent amount of energy.

parastatal—Partially or fully government-owned private corporation. Although managed autonomously, parastatal corpora-

tions in Belgium generally conform to government policy, and corporate presidents are appointed by government ministers.

pillar (*zuil*)—A term borrowed from the Netherlands by some Belgian sociologists and political scientists to refer to the Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist "spiritual families," "ideological groups," or "worlds" that may form the basis for social life and organization in Belgium. The pillarized society is a liberal modification of the corporatist society (*q.v.*).

proportional indexation system—Adjustment of wages commensurate with inflation to preserve purchasing power.

spiritual family (*famille spirituelle*—A complex of organizations whose members share social networks and worldview; also called "pillar" (*q.v.*).

value added—Additional value created at a given stage of production calculated as the difference between the product value at that stage and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).

Index

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550–65	Afghanistan
550–98	Albania
550–44	Algeria
550–50	Angola
550–73	Argentina
550–169	Australia
550–176	Austria
550–175	Bangladesh
550–170	Belgium
550–66	Bolivia
550–20	Brazil
550–168	Bulgaria
550–61	Burma
550–83	Burundi
550–50	Cambodia
550–177	Cameroon
550–159	Chad
550–77	Chile
550–60	China
550–63	China, Republic of
550–26	Colombia
550–91	Congo
550–90	Costa Rica
550–152	Cuba
550–22	Cyprus
550–158	Czechoslovakia
550–54	Dominican Republic
550–52	Ecuador
550–43	Egypt
550–150	El Salvador
550–28	Ethiopia
550–167	Finland
550–155	Germany, East
550–173	Germany, Fed. Rep. of
550–153	Ghana
550–87	Greece
550–78	Guatemala
550–174	Guinea
550–82	Guyana
550–164	Haiti
550–151	Honduras
550–165	Hungary
550–21	India
550–154	Indian Ocean
550–39	Indonesia
550–68	Iran
550–31	Iraq
550–25	Israel
550–182	Italy
550–69	Ivory Coast
550–177	Jamaica
550–30	Japan
550–34	Jordan
550–56	Kenya
550–81	Korea, North
550–41	Korea, South
550–58	Laos
550–24	Lebanon
550–38	Liberia
550–85	Libya
550–172	Malawi
550–45	Malaysia
550–161	Mauritania
550–79	Mexico
550–76	Mongolia
550–49	Morocco
550–64	Mozambique
550–35	Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim
550–88	Nicaragua
550–157	Nigeria
550–94	Oceania
550–48	Pakistan
550–46	Panama
550–156	Paraguay
550–185	Persian Gulf States
550–42	Peru
550–72	Philippines
550–162	Poland
550–181	Portugal
550–160	Romania

550–84	Rwanda
550–51	Saudi Arabia
550–70	Senegal
550–180	Sierra Leone
550–184	Singapore
550–86	Somalia
550–93	South Africa
550–95	Soviet Union
550–179	Spain
550–96	Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
550–27	Sudan
550–47	Syria
550–62	Tanzania
550–53	Thailand
550–178	Trinidad and Tobago
550–89	Tunisia
550–80	Turkey
550–74	Uganda
550–97	Uruguay
550–71	Venezuela
550–57	Vietnam, North
550–55	Vietnam, South
550–183	Yemens, The
550–99	Yugoslavia
550–67	Zaïre
550–75	Zambia
550–171	Zimbabwe

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1986 0-490-994